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Debating Delusion: A Critical Interrogation of Richard Dawkins' New Atheism
Gisèle Pritchard
Throughout his career, Richard Dawkins has argued that religious faith is
incommensurable with the evidence of Darwinian evolution (Dawkins 2006). In his
widely popular book, The God Delusion, he cements his perspective on religion: not only
is religious faith tantamount to delusion, but it is also dangerous. This thesis aims to
render explicit the presuppositions informing Dawkins' work and the Enlightenment
debates in which they are so deeply rooted. In particular, this thesis aims to elucidate the
ideology and secular worldview, with its attendant critical conception of the religious and
religious institutions, that inform Dawkins' conclusions in order to show that they are not
simply the obvious product of rational reflection or scientifically informed common-
sense, nor are they necessarily a universal interpretation of the immutable evidence of
nature, as he seems to claim. This project will interrogate the certainty and authority with
which Dawkins presents his view of science and religion, arguing that his "scientific"
viewpoint is itself a worldview, it is also constructed, and it has a history and context,
which Dawkins too readily glosses over. This thesis maintains the importance of such a
critical examination given the serious moral implications of Dawkins' position.
Dawkins' atheism entrenches the idea of an essential divide between scientific reason and
religion that it presents as real, historical and natural; and it seeks not only to silence, but
to eradicate any other perspectives, effectively rejecting and disregarding a huge segment
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"The enlightenment is under threat. So is reason. So is truth. So is science, especially in
the schools of America. I am one of those scientists who feels that it is no longer enough
just to get on and do science. We have to devote a significant proportion of our time and
resources to defending it from deliberate attack from organized ignorance. We even have
to go out on the attack ourselves, for the sake of reason and sanity." - Richard Dawkins
(http://richarddawkinsfoundation.org/)
Richard Dawkins is a well respected evolutionary biologist at the forefront of a
very vocal and militant form of atheism often referred to as "The New Atheism" (Haught,
ix) (Dawkins himself approves of the title militant atheism as he discusses in a TED talk).
The emergence of this new atheist voice is one of the most recent developments in the
public debate between science and religion. Often critiqued as a fundamentalist atheism ,
this recent expression of atheism positions itself in direct conflict with religion. Dawkins
is one of a number of charismatic advocates for the New Atheism, including Christopher
Hitchens, Daniel Dennet, Sam Harris and Bill Maher," who see their popular writing, and
various foundations, such as The Out Campaign3 and the Richard Dawkins Foundation
for Reason and Science4, as forces for the protection and restoration of reason in a world
that is increasingly overrun by superstition and faith. Throughout his career, Richard
Dawkins has argued that religious faith is incompatible with the evidence of Darwinian
1 cfHedges, Beattie.
2 Hitchens, Dennet, Harris and Dawkins are collectively referred to as "The Four Horsemen" within this
movement. Hitchens publications include, God is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (Twelve
Books, 2007); Dennett has written Breaking the Spell (Viking, 2006), Freedom Evolves (Viking Penguin,
2003) and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (Simon &Schuster, 1995); Harris has published The End ofFaith
(Norton, 2004) and Letter to a Christian Nation (Random House, 2006); and Bill Maher released the film
Religulous (TVA Films, 2008)
3 Aimed at raising atheist consciousness and solidarity, (http://outcampaign.org/)
4 A British foundation with a sister organization in the U.S., it is committed to defending reason from
deliberate attack from organized ignorance, (http://richarddawkinsfoundation.org/)
evolution (Dawkins 2006). In his widely popular book, The God Delusion (Bantam Press
2006) (with sales upwards of 1.5 million copies as of November, 2007), he cements his
stance on religion: not only is religious faith tantamount to delusion, but it is also
dangerous. Dawkins' work can seem very compelling to those who reject the chauvinism,
intolerance, anti-intellectualism and self-righteousness of religious fundamentalists and it
has found a certain acceptance with such an audience.
What might not be immediately apparent, however is the degree to which
Dawkins himself is open to every one of his critiques. Dawkins fails to recognize the
cultural specificity of his worldview - he fails to recognize that his "scientific'' viewpoint
is itself a worldview, that it is also constructed, and that it has a history and context. It is
not the necessary, universal inteipretation of the immutable evidence of nature, as he
seems to claim. Nor is it simply the obvious product of rational reflection, or
scientifically informed common-sense.
Dawkins' stated goals in writing The God Delusion are to convert people to
atheism, to demonstrate how irrational faith is, and to convince his audience that labeling
a child with a religious affiliation should be considered a form of child abuse. The
conflict at the heart of The God Delusion - a clash between religion and science - is
presented as real, historical and natural. As we will see, this is only one way of
constructing the relationship between religion and science. This thesis proposes that the
actual struggle informing The God Delusion is a battle of two fundamentalisms5: atheist
and religious. More than anything else, this struggle reflects an encounter between two
conflicting but related Utopian ideals. When seen in this way, the model of conflict is
5 Dawkins explicitly refutes this claim (Dawkins 2006, 282). Chapter 1 will expand on both the support for
this claim, and on his refutation.
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indeed inherent and necessary. There is no room for two universal standards of good and
evil. There is no room for two exclusive claims of truth. These worldviews are in
conflict because they are essentially the same project with a slightly different content and
both attempt to subjugate all other perspectives.
From the perspective of the New Atheists, either you are good, accept the logic
and rigour of science, and subscribe to the type of atheism they uphold, or you are evil,
deluded, and irrational. Ultimately, this thesis maintains the importance of examining the
worldview underlying this perspective, given the implicit and explicit moral implications
in Dawkins' work, namely that faith in god is the cause of much of the world's violence,
both physical and psychic, and that morality not only does not require belief in God, but
benefits from atheism. In clarifying the ideology and secular worldview informing The
God Delusion, I aim to critique the unnecessarily and dangerously polarized
representation of religion and science promoted by the New Atheists such as Dawkins.
Their view of religion renders untenable any possibility for inter-religious and pluralistic
dialogue.
Contribution to scholarship:
Critical responses to The God Delusion have tended to fall into one of two broad
_ categories: the first could be called the high academic response, and the second is the
response from people of faith.
Writers in the first group have presented a variety of critiques: Tina Beattie draws
on her background in gender and critical theory to contextualize and critique the New
Atheism and Mary Midgley provides an in-depth discussion of philosophical ideas
informing popular science. She discusses how scientific discourse - specifically
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evolution - is part of a greater complex of myths and narratives which function as
vehicles for meaning, calling into question the conviction that scientific theories are mere
objective fact.
Writers in the second group, including John Haught, Allster and Joanna McGrath
and Joseph Poulshock, focus on making a case for God by demonstrating the plausibility
of the existence of God, or the rationality of religious faith.
I submit that neither camp has succeeded in offering a straightforward, systematic
critique of Dawkins' project that would engage his avid readers. The academic response,
for instance in the work ofTina Beattie, presumes a working understanding of language
and concepts that are not necessarily familiar to a general audience. And many readers
may be predisposed to mistrust these concepts given Dawkins' rejection of
postmodernism, dismissing Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Julia Kristeva as
"icons of haute francophonyism" and his total refusal of even the appearance of
relativism (Dawkins 2006, 347). And those writing religious apologetics are starting
from a position of faith. To use the language of Dawkins, they are themselves deluded,
and thus not necessarily a credible source of critique. Furthermore, those writing from a
faith-based perspective are often attempting not only to justify their own beliefs, but to
present a persuasive argument for faith to the reader, or their writing is intended for a
religious audience. In either case, their critical perspective is likely invalidated for many
of Dawkins' fans.
Many reviewers of The God Delusion, including Fern Elsdon-Baker, Alister and
Joanna McGrath, Mary Midgley and Allen Orr have shared a sense of confusion about
Dawkins' motive. They wonder why an educated person who seems to know nothing
about religion, aside from a limited understanding of some fundamentalisms, has felt so
compelled to write and talk about it so much, and with such vitriol. His rhetorical style is
a mixture of argument and scorn, laden with insult, contempt and disdain, not only for
religious people, but for scientists who disagree with him and anyone who might refute
his approach.
These reviewers have also questioned his approach. Although he values the
scientific method as the only truly legitimate approach to knowledge and understanding -
Dawkins claims that as a scientist, he believes exclusively on the basis of evidence - he
fails to hold his work in The God Delusion to the minimum standards of the scientific
method. He positions himself as an authority on nearly everything without presenting
supporting evidence. The God Delusion is very clearly not an academic book. Instead, it
is more like a sermon or work of popular apologetics, complete with stories, illustrations
and quotations mixed with personal anecdotes and digressions. Indeed, Dawkins relies
more on anecdote in The God Delusion than actual evidence. And the evidence he does
provide is frequently problematic.
Methodology:
This thesis is an attempt to address those questions in a way that will engage the
very people that are (at least initially) persuaded by Dawkins' view of religion: secular
atheists and agnostics. The aim is to will critique Dawkins' representation of both science
and religion in The God Delusion in a way that is accessible to a general (thus not
necessarily academic) audience, although I have kept a general undergraduate audience
particularly in mind. I am in the unique position to undertake such a project given my
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graduate studies in religion and previous undergraduate work in Environmental Science
(BSc. McGiIl University, 2004).
While there are a number of possible approaches, I will use the concept of
"worldview" in order to offer a systematic discussion aimed at uncovering the ideological
underpinnings of Dawkins' thinking. I do so to critically examine his classifications and
ultimately call into question the certainty and authority with which he presents his view
of science. Although this discussion is particularly well suited to post-modern analysis, I
have chosen not to present an explicitly post-modern critique, because I intend to
demonstrate that Dawkins' perspective can be critiqued in terms that he would accept.
Considering the ideological underpinnings of his work allows us to understand
The God Delusion in a way that may not necessarily be evident from a cursory reading.
When considered in the context of his worldview, it makes sense that Dawkins would
structure the discussion between religion and science as an intractable conflict. It also
contextualizes his use of such a narrow and limited definition of religion to rail against.
And finally, it helps us understand what is really at stake for Dawkins - illustrating why
what Dawkins' presents initially as an epistemological problem quickly reveals itself to
be, more than anything else, for him, a moral problem - a question of good and evil. As
a result this thesis will also demonstrate that the moral dimensions of Dawkins' work
have some very real, disturbing implications which must be carefully examined.
Chapter summaries:
Before describing Dawkins' particular ideological commitments, in the first
chapter, I will familiarize the reader with the concept of "worldview" to demonstrate how
our knowledge of world and the meaning we ascribe to it both inform and are informed
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by our worldviews. In particular, I will show that Dawkins' worldview, like all
worldviews, is multi-faceted, a type of Universal Darwinism6 informed by secular
Utopian thinking rooted in an Enlightenment faith in the moral perfectibility of
humankind through the power of scientific knowledge over superstition. After describing
the particular contours of Dawkins' worldview - including its historical origins - I will
provide a critical discussion ofUtopian ideologies in order to highlight their inherent and
potentially dangerous totalitarian aspects, and lay the foundation for a critical appraisal
of Dawkins' assertion that atheism is better for society than religion. Having provided
this framework of descriptive definition in the first chapter, in the second chapter I will
move on to an analysis of Dawkins' construction of science in The God Delusion. His
representation of science presents it as a single coherent discourse that objectively reveals
natural truths. A discussion of the social construction of scientific knowledge will call
this representation into question with. I will also evaluate Dawkins' assertion that the
existence of God is a scientific hypothesis, and that science can and should evaluate all
truth claims. The third chapter will focus on a critique of his representation of religion,
examining the way his presuppositions and worldview inform the way he defines God,
religion, agnosticism and atheism. After providing alternate ways of thinking about these
concepts, the chapter will evaluate his assertion that religion is not only a delusion, but is
a pernicious delusion (Dawkins 2006, 31).
Chapter 1: Interpreting Existence — how our worldviews inform and are informed
by the way we see the world
6 A term coined by Dawkins in 1 983. "Universal Darwinism" in Evolutionfor Molecules to Man ed. D.S.
Bendali. Cambridge University Press.
This chapter begins by introducing the reader to the concept of worldviews, and
critique the confidence with which Richard Dawkins' presents his particular view of the
world as objective truth. This discussion frames our systematic description of his
ideological commitments, before moving on to establish the historical contingency of his
worldview and providing a critical discussion of some of its aspects. Before proceeding,
it is important to note that attempting to describe a person's worldview is difficult. It is an
exercise in interpretation, and it is important to guard against over-extrapolation or
overconfidence in the veracity or fixity ofthat interpretation, especially when the
description is mostly based on a single work. The discussion of Dawkins' worldview that
follows is based on his writing in The God Delusion, and while it would be more accurate
to describe it as "Dawkins' worldview in The God Delusion, " for brevity's sake of, I will
frequently be referring simply to "Dawkins' worldview". This discussion is aimed at an
analysis and critique of how science, religion and their inter-relationship are defined in
The God Delusion. The presentation of his worldview will limited to a discussion of the
aspects of his understanding of the world that contribute to these categories.
What's in a worldview?
Worldviews can be broadly defined as a general philosophy of life.7 As such,
they make up the totality of our beliefs about reality. More specifically, worldviews
We will be using William Cobern's adaptation of the Kearney logico-structural model of worldviews as
the foundation of our definition. Kearney's model, which is based on anthropological research, is
developed in his book, Worldview (1984). Cobern's model differs from Kearney's in rejecting the Marxist
and materialist tenets in Kearney's writings. Cobern asserts convincingly that Kearney's model is not
inherently Marxist, nor is it essentially materialistic (two major critiques of this model), but that these
tendencies are a result of Kearney's view of mechanism as not merely a method, but as a metaphysic
(Cobern, 3). As a Professor of Biological Sciences and Science Education and the Director of the
Mallinson Institute for Science Education, Cobern has adapted Kearney's worldview model to form part of
a mechanistic method for exploring the interaction between a student's existing worldview, and scientific
worldviews. His use of Kearney's worldview model is concerned with epistemology, not ontology
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make up the basic, culturally-dependent, organization of the mind. Functioning as mental
frameworks, they manifest themselves as a set of assumptions which predispose us to
feel, think and act in certain ways. Worldviews are the matrices of thought, conscious
and unconscious, that provide the tools with which we decide what is important and what
can be ignored (Midgely 2004, 4). Worldviews are the interpretive frameworks that
order a person's existence into a meaningful world, and they do so by performing five
functions.
The first function is to explain both how and why things are the way they are, as
well as why they continue in the way they do. The second is to validate the goals,
institutions and values of a society and to provide a means for evaluating both outside
influences as well as activities and attitudes within society. Thirdly, a worldview both
encourages and prescribes behavior -it supports people at times of anxiety or crisis by
providing security and reinforcing behavior. As its fourth function, a worldview allows us
to order and systematize our sense perceptions. And finally, worldviews perform an
adaptive function by serving to reconcile differences between old understandings and
new information in order to maintain a state of equilibrium. Worldviews are thus both
stable and resilient (Cobern, 3). Thus, a worldview defines the self by setting the
boundaries of who and what the individual is. At the same time, by determining
everything that is not the self, it also defines the 'other', as well as our relationships and
(Cobern, 3) and as such is well suited to our discussion of how worldviews influence our understanding of
the natural world. According to Micheal Kearney, all human activity proceeds from a cognitive root.
Although this assumption could be called into question, this model remains useful as a framework for a
systematic discussion of the influence ofDawkins' ideology on his work. As Cobern cautions, "it is
important to note that the concept of worldview has no common sense counterpart. Any worldview model
is an abstraction derived from certain observed phenomena, but is not a picture of those phenomena7'
(Cobern, 3).
s When studied from the perspective of anthropology.
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responsibilities towards all that is 'other.' It shapes our view of the universe and our
conceptions of time. It influences our norms and values (Cobern, 3).
A worldview is formed as the result of our need to relate to the outside world.
Humankind's experience is useless unless interpreted. While a worldview consists of the
basic assumptions and images that provide a more or less coherent way of thinking about
the world, this view of the world is not necessarily accurate, (Kearney, 41) and it is not
the manifestation of some universal truth. Rather than providing an accurate depiction of
reality, worldviews are what make it possible for people to conceptualize what reality
should be like. The evidence of daily life is understood according to this framework
(Cobern, 3).
Beginning in childhood, we interact with our physical and social environments.
Through these myriad interactions, worldview presuppositions are unconsciously
constructed in a process that occurs over an extended period of time with the childhood
years being the most important. Formal education also contributes to the development of
a worldview (Cobern, 4). In adulthood, the malleability of one's worldview begins to
decrease; it becomes resilient in the face of change, thereby providing adults with
cognitive stability (Cobern, 4). Worldviews are robust, able to accommodate the bulk of
our experiences, yet flexible enough to negotiate paradox or evidence that is contrary to
some previously held view without crumbling. Although an adult's worldview
presuppositions are strongly held, they are capable of changing. The strength with which
a mature worldview is held appears to be inversely related to the degree of the
surrounding culture's heterogeneity. The more heterogeneous, the less strongly a
worldview tends to be held (Cobern, 4).
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When thinking about worldviews, we usually think about groups, not individuals.
The concept of a worldview is most often associated with civilizations, religions and eras,
such as a Western worldview, a Christian worldview, or a medieval worldview. Contrary
to Dawkins' portrayal of religion as the most powerful force acting on an individual (e.g.
Dawkins 2006, 303), it is but one of many factors that influence the way we see the
world. And while religion can be a powerful force shaping the contours of à worldview,
its influence varies depending on the cultural context, and in some cases, it is almost
impossible to distinguish from other factors. Given that a worldview may be expressed
more or less systematically in cosmology, philosophy, ethics, religious ritual, and
scientific belief, it is sometimes more helpful to think of religion and philosophy as part
of the specific content of a worldview (Cobern, 3). We only have to consider the wide
variety of Christian responses to an issue such as evolution - from complete rejection to
complete acceptance - to see that Christianity functions as part of a larger network of
concepts and norms.
While it is commonplace to talk about various different religious or philosophical
worldviews, particularly those that are clearly distinct from mainstream Western culture,
it is less common to discuss scientific worldviews. This might be in part because the
'scientific' worldview is the defacto worldview of mainstream Western culture. And
rather than being understood as a particular worldview, it is often understood as 'seeing
the world as it really is;' the normative framework by which other worldviews are
identified and evaluated. Furthermore, even when the scientific worldview is identified
as such, it is frequently assumed that there is a single, unified scientific worldview, in
large part because the popular perception of science is that there is a single, uncontested
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discourse that we call 'Science'. We are fond of saying, "science says" or "science does"
losing sight of the fact that science doesn't say or do anything. Science is a set of
methods and practices by which we seek to answer certain questions and produce certain
types of knowledge. Science as a field of study has a history; it is made up of a variety of
subjects as well as a variety of cultures and philosophies with different values and ideals.
As such, it is compatible with a number of worldviews, but does not represent the
objective truth about the world.
The modern scientific worldview is a uniquely Western phenomenon that came
out of intellectual tumult of the 16th , 17th and 18th centuries in Europe. The mechanistic
view of the universe, exemplified by Descartes, and empiricism, exemplified by Bacon,
and developed by the experimental work of Newton and Boyle became the basis of
modern science. As will be considered in greater detail later in the second chapter, the
scientific worldview as commonly presented is a reductionist worldview that sees the
explanation of the whole in the parts, and considers machine-type analogies appropriate
for natural phenomena (Cobern, 4). Though twentieth and twenty-first century physics is
modifying the classical scientific worldview, it remains a thoroughly empirical view that
stresses the importance of testable hypotheses concerning natural causes. Since its
inception, modern science and its attendant worldview have slowly spread beyond
European borders.
The emergence of science as an independent discipline requires a scientifically
compatible worldview, and not all worldviews are entirely consistent with scientific
thinking (Cobern, 4). For example, people of nonscientific, non-technological societies
often have worldviews that are incompatible with it. Even in highly scientific cultures,
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there are some whose worldviews are not entirely reconciled with a scientific worldview,
such as those who find their religious beliefs are contradicted or disputed by the findings
and conclusions of modern science. However, though their worldviews might be
partially or totally incompatible with scientific thinking, this is not to say, as Dawkins
does that these individuals are irrational. Rather, their rationality is based on a different
worldview, which results in nonscientific ways of thinking.
The concept of rationality is a complex issue and a full discussion is beyond the
scope of this thesis. But in brief, to be rational means to think and act with reason, and to
be consistent with or based on logic. Thoughts or actions that are consistent with one's
worldview, therefore, are rational. Scientific thinking, while employing logic and reason,
is not the single definition of rationality. As there can be great discrepancies between
worldviews: what is considered rational in the context of one worldview might seem
completely irrational when evaluated according to the presuppositions of another. Some,
like Dawkins, see replacing the worldview of nonscientific people as the ultimate goal of
science education. If he is to be believed, this is the only option. But there is another
perspective, one that might build bridges between the enterprise of science and
nonscientific worldviews (Cobem, 5). Instead of converting or colonizing these
worldviews, this perspective seeks to reconcile them with scientific thinking while
continuing to recognize that the those functioning within these worldviews are fully
rational, intelligent human beings with an alternate - not deluded - way of seeing and
interpreting their experience.
Dawkins' worldview as it informs The God Delusion
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Dawkins' worldview is rooted in Utopian ideology and a nineteenth century
development of the Enlightenment project, elements that result in it its fundamentalist
character. His perspective in The God Delusion can be somewhat artificially summed up
under the title: Utopian Universal Darwinism - although properly speaking, the
'Darwinism' informing his worldview should be more correctly be called 'neo-
Darwinism' (a term we will discuss in greater detail in chapter two) as it draws heavily
on modern genetic theory. Universal Darwinism refers to the application of the ideas and
theories of Darwinian evolution beyond their original sphere oforganic evolution on
earth. In The God Delusion, it is Dawkins' goal to explain the biological roots of religion
and human morality with reference to Darwinian evolution, reducing them to a misfiring
of otherwise beneficial adaptations and a sophisticated form of selfishness, respectively.
To explain the origin and spread of particular beliefs, Dawkins proposes his "même
theory", a Darwinian approach to understanding mind, language and culture (we will
elaborate on these ideas in the second chapter).
Universal Darwinism is a form of scientific naturalism, an extension of an
enlightenment conception of science that achieved prominence in the early nineteenth
century and gained importance throughout the Victorian period. This epistemological
view undertakes explanation exclusively by reference to natural causes and events, _
holding that matter is the fundamental reality of the universe. Scientific naturalism
asserts the universal scope of the scientific method, the universality of natural laws and
the adequacy of science to provide a universal, deterministic cosmology beyond which no
further knowledge or way of knowing exists. It denies teleology, metaphysics and
miracle, thus effectively excluding and rejecting clerical authority and the credibility of
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religious knowledge (Barnes and Shapin, 93). Dawkins takes a reductive approach to
scientific explanation, believing that the whole can be understood in terms of in terms of
its component parts. Like all reductionists, he believes that science should consist of a
careful investigation of material/natural phenomenon in an attempt to break them down
into their simplest, most basic parts. Once the phenomenon has been reduced to its
constituent units, the scientist then studies how these units combine together to produce
more complex phenomena. Thus, complex phenomena are reduced to a combination of
far more simple, basic interactions. This methodology is rooted in the belief that nature is
organized by simple universal laws of physics and that any phenomenon can eventually
be reduced to these laws, and therefore explained. His work in The God Delusion
combines a reductionist perspective with an assertion of the omnicompetence of science,
extending scientific naturalism beyond material phenomena to cultural and psychological
phenomena. Dawkins believes that the scientific method is the only reliable path to
knowledge and he sees atheism as a necessary and obvious result of a scientific
worldview. He also holds that this is the only legitimate perspective for a scientist. As
evidenced in The God Delusion, Dawkins cannot tolerate alternative perspectives from
other scientists. He claims that those with a different perspective are being disengenous,
dishonest, or have ulterior motives like greed, especially with respect to receiving a
Templeton grant, which is awarded for research in science and religion (Dawkins 2006,
19), (Dakwins 2006, 153). He suggests that "great scientists of our times who sound
religious usually turn out not to be so when you examine their beliefs more deeply,"
regardless of what these scientists themselves have to say about their beliefs (Dawkins
2006, 14). He holds the same view of scientists who suggest science should be agnostic
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about questions such as the existence of God, calling them 'The Neville Chamberlain
School of Evolutionists." (Dawkins 2006, 66). He proposes that they are taking this
position not as an epistemological position, but as a political position in response to "the
threat of populist creationism," arguing that they are "bending over backwards" to appeal
to mainstream religion (Dawkins 2006, 66).
In his review of The God Delusion, evolutionary geneticist, H. Allen Orr suggests
that one of the most interesting questions about Dawkins' book is why it was written.
"Why does he feel he has anything significant to say about religion and what gives him
the sense of authority presumably needed to say it at book length?" (Orr, para 5). The
purpose of this thesis is to provide a possible, systematic answer to that question. I
believe that Universal Darwinism accounts for the 'what' of The God Delusion - the
attempt to evaluate all knowledge claims using the methods of scientific inquiry and the
inclination to apply the concepts of Darwinian evolution to explain cultural phenomenon.
And the utopian/fundamentalist tendencies account for the 'why' of The God Delusion -
why it is written in the tone that it is, why epistemological issues take on moral and
ethical implications, and why Dawkins constructs the relationship between religion and
science as one of immutable conflict.
Perhaps the best place to start an in-depth discussion of Dawkins' worldview is
with his response to the criticism that his perspective is "nineteenth century". This
criticism arose in the context of a conference on science and religion held at Cambridge
9 Orr frequently reviews books that seek to link biological ideas to religion or philosophy - this aspect of his
work was specifically cited in his appointment as Shirley Cox Kearns Professor
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University and sponsored by the Templeton Foundation. According to Dawkins, he
was the 'token atheist' among eighteen invited speakers (Dawkins 2006, 153). As
Dawkins tells it, he challenged the theologians to answer his assertion that "a God
capable of designing a universe would have to be complex and statistically improbably"
(Dawkins 2006, 153). Although he admits the possibility of a superhuman designer of
the universe, he asserts that it would "most certainly not be a designer who just popped
into existence or who always existed." He goes on to say that, while he doesn't for a
moment believe that our universe was designed, if it was, "and afortiori if that designer
reads our thoughts and hands out omniscient advice, forgiveness and redemption, the
designer himself musí (my italics) be the end product of some kind of cumulative
escalator or crane, perhaps a version of Darwinism in another universe" (Dawkins 2006,
1 56). According to Dawkins, the theologians (he doesn't specify who they were)
responded by suggesting that he was "brutally foisting a scientific epistemology upon an
unwilling theology" (Dawkins 2006, 1 53). He was asked "who was he to dictate to
theologians that their God had to be complex?" and "who was he to say that rational
arguments was the only admissible kind of argument?" The theologians claimed that
there were other ways of knowing that must be deployed to know God, chiefly a personal
10 The mission of the Templeton Foundation is to serve as a philanthropic catalyst for discovery in areas
engaging life's biggest questions. These questions range from explorations into the laws of nature and the
universe to questions on the nature of love, gratitude, forgiveness, and creativity. Our vision is derived
from Sir John Templeton's commitment to rigorous scientific research and related scholarship. The
Foundation's motto "How little we know, how eager to learn" exemplifies our support for open-minded
inquiry and our hope for advancing human progress through breakthrough discoveries
(http://www.templeton.org/)· The Foundation's views on the connections between religious and scientific
inquiry and their awarding of significant grants for scientific research have led to criticism from some
within the scientific community for promoting an agenda of reconciling religion and science and it is
suggested that Templeton's money is used to influence scientific research towards a convergence between
science and religion (eg Richard Dawkins; Peter Woit, a mathematical physicist at Columbia University;
John Horgan, a science journalist; and Sean M. Carroll, a cosmologist at the University of Chicago).
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subjective experience of God (Dawkins 2006, 154). Dawkins rejects discussions about
subjective experiences of God, reducing them to illusion and hallucination. He
complains that scientific arguments that he is accustomed to deploying were deemed
inappropriate since the theologians maintained that God lay outside of science; and that
the theologians were defining themselves into an epistemological safe-zone where
rational arguments could not reach them because they had "declared by fiat that it could
not" (Dawkins 2006, 154). He goes on to say,
The last ditch defense by my critics in Cambridge was attack. My whole
worldview was condemned as nineteenth-century. This is such a bad argument
that I almost omitted to mention it. But regrettably I encounter it rather
frequently. Needless to say, to call an argument nineteenth-century is not the
same as explaining what is wrong with it. Some nineteenth-century ideas were
very good ideas, not least Darwin's own dangerous idea... In any case, I know the
'nineteenth-century' taunt of old. It goes with the 'village atheist' gibe. It goes
with 'Contrary to what you seem to think Ha Ha Ha we don't believe in an old
man with a long white beard any more Ha Ha Ha.' All three jokes are code for
something else, just as when I lived in America in the late 1960s, 'law and order'
was politicians' code for anti-black prejudice. What, then, is the coded meaning
of 'You are so nineteenth-century' in the context of an argument about religion?
It is code for: 'You are so crude and unsubtle, how could you be so insensitive
and ill-mannered as to ask me a direct, point-blank question like "Do you believe
in miracles?" or "Do you believe Jesus was born of a virgin?" Don't you know
that in polite society we don't ask such questions? That sort of question went out
in the nineteenth century.' But think of why it is impolite to ask such direct,
factual questions of religious people today. It is because it is embarrassing! But
it is the answer that is embarrassing, if it is yes. The nineteenth century
connection is now clear. The nineteenth century is the last time when it was
possible for an educated person to believe in miracles like the virgin birth without
embarrassment... Hence, if somebody like me insists on asking the question, it is I
who am accused of being nineteenth-century. It is really quite funny if you think
aboutit. (Dawkins 2006, 156-157)
Dawkins is right, calling an idea nineteenth-century is not the same as saying what's
wrong with it, and not all nineteenth-century ideas are bad. So what does it mean to call
his worldview nineteenth-century, and why is this intended as critique? The meaning,
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coded or otherwise, of calling someone nineteenth century in the context of this argument
about religion is that, among other things, they are reproducing the nineteenth century
model of inquiry in which imperialism and scientific rationalism go hand in hand.
Contrary to Dawkins suggestion, the problem is not necessarily with the questions he
asks of religious people, but lies instead in the way in which he asks them. He is
perpetuating the scientific imperialism of the nineteenth century which sought to extend
the reach of the scientific method beyond the study of the natural world and turned its
thoroughly unsympathetic gaze on human feeling and behavior, objectifying and
belittling large segments of the population under the auspices of scientific investigation,
treating them as less than fully human. And this is decidedly not funny, if you think
about it.
The influence of nineteenth century thought on Dawkins' work is nowhere more
striking than in his construction and definition of religion. He presents religion as though
it was a single, unitary object, alternately rejecting, ignoring or collapsing all diversity.
Although he indicates that he is mostly talking about the three Abrahamic faiths, and
Christianity in particular, because these will be the traditions most familiar to his readers,
he over-extrapolates, arriving at conclusions about all religions on the basis of limited
insight from these, traditions - generalizations that are rarely justified or explained
beyond his assertion that they are all just superstitious nonsense. His understanding of
religion is clearly informed by his own religious experience (an idea that we will expand
on in the third chapter), and a limited grasp of the most common forms of extremism,
which he believes can stand in the place of any engagement with religious thought and,
more surprisingly, any serious engagement with the considerable academic scholarship
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on religion. He explicitly rejects the notion that he should deal with theology and
indicates that Darwinian thinkers like himself are uninterested in any explanations for the
origin of religion that are not based on natural selection, such as political or
psychological explanations (Dawkins 2006, 34). However, much scholarship on religion
is not limited to, or even particularly interested in the origins of the religion. Dawkins
rejects all contemporary scholarship on religion, including the contributions of
anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, and philosophy in favour of the nineteenth
century religious theories of James Frazer,1 1 Max Weber and William James.
In her critical rebuttal, Catholic scholar Tina Beattie contends that in order to
understand "how 'religion' functions in the world according to Dawkins," we must
situate him in the context of nineteenth-century scholarship and imperialism in which
cultures dominated by a white male elite remain caught up in a territorial battle of
colonization and conquest (Beattie, 46). She argues that New Atheists such as Dawkins,
in their uncritical engagement with outmoded theories of religion, are recapitulating the
perspective of the Victorian scholars who saw themselves as beacons of progress in a
world of seething ignorance and barbarism (Beattie, 46). Believing themselves to be at
the highest level of knowledge and civilization, those early scientists sought an objective
vantage point from which to study and categorize the 'inferior' races and tribes they were
11 Sir James George Frazer (1 January 1854, Glasgow, Scotland - 7 May 1 94 1 , Cambridge), was a Scottish
social anthropologist. His most famous work, and the one Dawkins cites, is The Golden Bough ( 1 890), in
which Frazer documents and describes similar magical and religious beliefs from across the globe.
12 Max Weber (21 April 1864-14 June 1920) was a German lawyer, politician, historian, political
economist, and sociologist, who profoundly influenced social theory
13 William James (January 11, 1842 -August 26, 1910) was an early American psychologist and
philosopher, trained as a medical doctor. He also wrote influential books on the psychology of religious
experience and mysticism.
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discovering, championing the burgeoning, 'scientific' l4 disciplines of anthropology and
psychology. These scientists believed that their work was necessary to understand and
speed along what they saw as the natural evolution of human societies from primitive
savagery to civilization for the benefit of all mankind. The evolutionary view of religion
that Dawkins refers to was popularized in the nineteenth century by men like James
Frazer (Dawkins 2006, 32). Frazer posited that human belief progressed through three
stages: primitive magic, replaced by religion, in turn replaced by science. The notion that
religion is a primitive version of science was popularized in late nineteenth century in
Frazer's, The Golden Bough. In this work, religion and superstition were understood to
be rooted in fear and ignorance, vestiges of the primitive stages of human development
that should and would disappear with the advance of knowledge. These scientists
believed that their work had a moral as well as scientific purpose. Frazer asserts that,
the comparative study of the beliefs and institutions of mankind is fitted to be
much more than a means of satisfying an enlightened curiosity and of furnishing
materials for the researches of the learned. Well handled, it may become a
powerful instrument to expedite progress if it lays bare certain weak spots in the
foundations on which modern society is built - if it shows that much which we
are wont to regard as solid rests on the sands of superstition rather than on the
rock of nature (Frazer, 4).
Dawkins echoes the core of this sentiment in The God Delusion. And, although he
mocks the religious beliefs described in The Golden Bough, he does not question Frazer's
conclusions or his credibility (Dawkins 2006, 36). Beattie argues that, like those
nineteenth century scholars, "the New Atheists labour under the delusion of their own
14 There is and was some debate over whether these disciplines should properly be called scientific. In the
nineteenth century, it was believed that human beings could be objectified and studied like any other
natural phenomenon. This methodology and the ideology underlying it have been subject to vigorous
critique coming out of feminist, post-colonial, post-structuralist and post-modern critiques to name a few,
and both have been all but completely rejected by contemporary social scientists.
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superior knowledge, from the perspective of an evolutionary ideology which clouds their
judgment and distorts their understanding as surely as any religious world-view might"
(Beattie, 46). As we will see, the war of scientific atheism against religion can be
understood as a continuation of this endeavour to purge 'cultured' society of the
influence of primitive superstition.
Orr asserts that the reason Dawkins thinks he has something to say about God is
that he is an evolutionary biologist,15 and Darwinism had an early and noisy run-in with
religion. Orr goes on to caution the reader that although Dawkins presents his argument
as scientific, The God Delusion is not a work of evolutionary biology in particular or
science more generally (Orr para. 5). What Dawkins fails to consider is that the reaction
of many religious leaders to evolutionary theory had complex causes involving equal
parts ignorance, fear, politics, power (Orr para. 5). It is also important to note that in the
nineteenth century as much as in our own time, the conflict between science and religion
involved a minority of extremists in both camps. The overall picture is far less
antagonistic than the metaphor of warfare suggests. The current confrontation between
atheism/science and religion must be understood within a particular context. Dawkins is
responding, in part, to the very real contemporary conflict between evolutionary science
13 None of this is to say that evolutionary biology cannot inform our view of religion. It can and it does. We
should not conclude that there is no dialogue to be had between science and religion. The view proposed
by Gould in Rocks ofAges - that religion and science should be considered non-overlapping magisterium -
is overly simplistic. Science and religion have informed each other's development and there have been,
and likely will continue to be, real disagreements between 'legitimate'' science and 'authentic' religion. Orr
suggests that some of the issues involved are epistemological (Do scientific and religious claims simply
begin with different premises, the first materialist and the second not?) and others ethical (where do we
draw the line between what medicine can accomplish and what it should be allowed to accomplish). He
asserts, and I agree, that if such discussions are to be worthwhile, they will have to take place at a far higher
level of sophistication than Dawkins seems willing or able to muster (Orr para. 5).
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and creationism. However, in over-extrapolating from specific conflicts to suggest that
all science and all religion are necessarily and eternally antagonistic, Dawkins is
reproducing the nineteenth century's constructed battle, not revealing a natural and
inherent conflict. Recent research by historians reveals a more complex, historical debate
between scientists and Christian believers over the implications of the theory of evolution
when it was introduced. The conflict between "Darwin's dangerous idea" and repressive,
superstitious religion was not necessary, and may indeed have been somewhat
exaggerated (Dawkins 2006, 1 56). Stephen J. Gould describes the late nineteenth
century's construction of the model of warfare between science and religion as a guiding
theme of Western history (Gould 2004).
Tina Beattie suggests that to understand the ongoing struggle between evolutionary
science and religion, it is necessary to situate Darwin in the context of the changing
relationship between theology and science in Victorian England (Beattie, 19). Both
science and religion are umbrella terms for a wide range of human ideas and practices,
and both have a long history of different meanings. According to Beattie, they acquired
something close to their contemporary meaning in the nineteenth century (Beattie, 19).
The word 'science' comes from the Latin scientia, meaning knowledge, and was a
generic word to describe all forms of knowledge for most of Western intellectual history.
For example, theology was known as 'the queen of the sciences' in medieval Europe
because it was the forni ofknowledge which informed all others. When science was
concerned with the study of natural laws and the material world, it was known as natural
philosophy (Beattie, 20). In the middle of the nineteenth century, it acquired the
narrower meaning that we are familiar with today.
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The development of an independent, scientific worldview in the late nineteenth
century affected all areas of knowledge, including religion. Although Beattie asserts that
it is difficult to know precisely what the word meant in its initial usage, the word
'religion' comes from the Latin religio, which referred in various ways to the rituals and
cults of the Roman empire and their associated duties (Beattie, 39). The temi was
adopted by the early Christians distinguish their own practices and beliefs from those of
other religions, but it continued to have a variety of meanings throughout different
Christian eras. In the nineteenth century, the category of religion came to be more
narrowly understood as referring to all those aspects of human behavior and belief which
had been bracketed out of a scientific world-view (Beattie, 39). Religion is explicitly ,
defined as science's 'other'.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, science had been the pursuit of more or
less skilled amateurs, many of whom understood their work in terms of natural theology
(Beattie, 20). The term 'scientist' became popular towards the end of the nineteenth
century when science emerged as an independent profession. As scientists began to
displace the authority of theologians and clergymen, some members of the scientific
community came into direct conflict with the clerics and theologians who had, until that
point, been the academic and moral authorities (Beattie, 20). Beattie argues that, from
this perspective, the nineteenth century conflict between science and religion was not
only a struggle between religious and scientific ways of explaining the world. It was.
more importantly, a power struggle occuring at the extremes between men of science and
men of God, most of them socially conservative members of the English ruling class
(Beattie, 20). Beattie suggests that, given this power struggle, it was not in the interest of
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those more militant scientists to make any concessions to their religions counterparts.
The triumph of scientific authority required the total discrediting of theological
knowledge (Beattie, 20). The assault of militant scientists on the Christian bastions of
professional and academic life coincided with a widespread religious revival that
extended from Britain and parts of Europe to America, and which was manifest in
different ways in the Nonconformist, Anglican, and Catholic churches. All of which
reinforced scientists' belief that they were locked in a battle for truth against the forces of
religious intolerance and superstition (Beattie, 22). Dawkins understands the present as
a near perfect repetition of the encounter between nineteenth century science and
religion, with the same stakes. He positions himself as one of the militant scientist
attempting to eradicate religion for the betterment of humanity.
Is Dawkins a fundamentalist?
Dawkins rejects the charge that he is a fundamentalist, devoting a section of The God
Delusion to disposing of this "distressingly common" accusation. However, in defining
fundamentalism as he does, his rejection is almost meaningless. Rather than presenting
and engaging with a definition of fundamentalism that is rooted in careful academic
research on the subject, his discussion reflects his personal opinion about what constitutes
the defining characteristics of the phenomenon. His discussion of fundamentalism fails to
do the due diligence one would expect of a scientist, especially one who is so strongly
advocating a universal application of the scientific method. Dawkins defines
fundamentalism with an eye to the conclusion he plans to draw: that he cannot rightly be
called a fundamentalist. Instead, he suggests that "it is all too easy to confuse
fundamentalism with passion" (Dawkins 2006, 283), and while he may appear
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passionate when defending evolution against a fundamentalist creationist, this passionate
response is not the result of a rival fundamentalism of his own (Dawkins 2006, 283). He
goes on to "reject the 'tiresome' red herring that a scientists' belief in evidence is itself a
matter of fundamentalist faith because all of us believe in evidence in our own lives,
whatever we may profess with our amateur philosophical hats on" (Dawkins 2006, 282).
He admits the possibility that scientists might be fundamentalists when it comes to
defining what is meant by 'truth' in some abstract way, but asserts that so is everybody
else, stating that, "I am no more fundamentalist when I say that evolution is true than
when I say it is true that New Zealand is in the southern hemisphere. We believe
evolution because evidence supports it, and we should abandon it overnight if new
evidence arose to disprove it. No real fundamentalist would ever say anything like
that"16 (Dawkins 2006, 283). Dawkins is not entirely wrong in his characterization
fundamentalism. But, without presenting any supporting research, and basing his
definition of fundamentalist in the proof that it does not apply to him, he has left out
several key characteristics of fundamentalism - perhaps not coincidentally, the very
characteristics that support the claim that he is a fundamentalist.
In The God Delusion, Dawkins asserts that the defining characteristic of
fundamentalism is that "fundamentalists know they are right because they have read the
truth in a holy book and they know, in advance, that nothing will budge them from their
16 The section on the work ofThomas Kuhn in chapter 2 will demonstrate that this understanding of science
is, at best, idealistic. The scientific discipline is a little more resistant to change than Dawkins suggests
here. Indeed, although faced with growing evidence that his understanding of evolution might require
some revision, Dawkins remains adamantly unwavering in his position, choosing to reinteipret that
evidence to fit his theory in ways that are openly rejected by other members of the scientific community
(Elsdon-Baker 2009). More on this in chapter 2.
17 Although the argument that I am making here is that his atheism is a fundamentalist form of atheism.
Fern Elsdon-Baker has an excellent discussion of his fundamentalist tendencies with respect to
evolutionary theory.
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belief (Dawkins 2006, 282). In order to dispose of the accusation that he is a
fundamentalism, Dawkins contrasts fundamentalism with scientific thinking stating that,
...the truth of the holy book is an axiom, not the end product of a process of
reasoning. The book is true, and if the evidence seems to contradict it, it is the
evidence that must be thrown out, not the book. By contrast, what I, as a scientist
believe (for example evolution) I believe not because of reading a holy book, but
because I have studied the evidence. Books about evolution are believed because
they present overwhelming quantities of mutually buttressed evidence. When a
science book is wrong, somebody eventually discovers the mistake and it is
corrected in subsequent books. That conspicuously doesn't happen with holy
books (Dawkins 2006, 282).
As we will see in chapter two, some of the assertions he makes here about science have
been called into question, particularly when his definition is compared with one that takes
research into fundamentalisms into consideration. The Fundamentalism Project is a five
volume project, aimed at both academics and a more general audience, edited by
American scholars of religion, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby while at the
University of Chicago. 18 In the first volume, Fundamentalisms Observed, they
interrogate the tendency in popular discourse to uncritically talk about fundamentalism as
though it was a single entity, ignoring the basic differences between these groups
18 The Fundamentalism Project is not without its critics. One objection is that many of the movements that
Marty and Appleby categorize as fundamentalist seem to be motivated less by the rejection of modernity
than by social, ethnic, and nationalistic grievances. Their work omits the crucial roles played by geo-
politics in creating the contemporary dynamics of religio-politics (cf Mahmood, 29). Another critique of
Marty and Appleby's approach calls into question such a broad application of the term fundamentalism, a
term which originally referred to a movement in American Protestantism, to describe movements in other
religions, particularly non-Western ones. Although the editors and contributors claim that they are
emptying the term of its socio-historical specificity, their work has been denounced as Eurocentric
conceptual imperialism, "exemplifying scholarship that utilizes European history as a privileged referent to
social and political development in the non-Western world" (Mahmood, 29; cfCassanova, 103;
Westerman, 77). A third objection is that the term fundamentalism has significant negative connotations
especially as this work seems to contrast it negatively with liberal thought and the liberal academic
establishment (cf Casanova, 102; Swatos Jr, 67; Westerman, 77). While these critiques should be taken
seriously, the Fundamentalism Project remains one of the most comprehensive studies of fundamentalism,
and one that has provided a working definition of this phenomenon that takes into account a wide variety o
movements and traditions, as such this work provides a valuable contrast and critique of Dawkins' narrow,
unconsidered definition of fundamentalism.
(Appleby and Marty, 815). Following a discussion of fundamentalisms from a wide
variety of religious traditions, they conclude that while fundamentalisms are plural, it is
possible to discuss fundamentalism as a phenomenon, and that fundamentalism is a
"useful label for movements that, despite their differences, bear a strong family
resemblance and tend to follow a certain pattern" (Appleby and Marty, 815). Karen
Armstrong provides an elegant summary of Appleby and Marty's conclusions, stating
that fundamentalisms are
embattled forms of spirituality, which have emerged as a response to a perceived
crisis. They are engaged in a conflict with enemies whose secularist policies and
beliefs seem inimical to religion itself. Fundamentalists do not regard this battle
as a conventional political struggle, but experience it as a cosmic war between the
forces of good and evil. They fear annihilation, and try to fortify their
beleaguered identity by means of a selective retrieval of certain doctrines and
practices of the past. To avoid contamination, they often withdraw from
mainstream society to create a counterculture; yet fundamentalists are not
impractical dreamers. They have absorbed the pragmatic rationalism of
modernity, and, under the guidance of their charismatic leaders, they refine these
' fundamentals ' so as to create an ideology that provides the faithful with a plan of
action. Eventually they fight back and attempt to re-sacrilize and increasingly
skeptical world (Appleby and Marty as described in Armstrong, x-xi).
This way of defining fundamentalism is far more complex than Dawkins' attempt in The
God Delusion. Let us compare the mission statement of the, Richard Dawkins
Foundation for Reason and Science, with the above definition of fundamentalism.
The enlightenment is under threat. So is reason. So is truth. So is science,
especially in the schools of America. I am one of those scientists who feels that it
is no longer enough just to get on and do science. We have to devote a significant
proportion of our time and resources to defending it from deliberate attack from
organized ignorance. We even have to go out on the attack ourselves, for the sake
of reason and sanity. - Richard Dawkins (http://richarddawkinsfoundation.org/)
Can a definition that has religion as one of its key parameters be applied to atheism?
Yes. Although atheism differs from religion in that it rejects the concept of divinity, like
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religion, it is a matter of belief, rather than an empirical truth - contrary to Dawkins'
suggestion. Furthermore, Dawkins' understanding of the relationship between science
and religion, between liberal 'enlightened' models of society and 'medieval' religious
models mirrors that described by Appleby and Marty's definition of religious
fundamentalists, with the poles reversed. His perspective is a fundamentalist perspective.
Switching the religious qualifiers with scientific qualifiers in Armstrong's summary, we
find the attitude of Dawkins and the New Atheists. Rather than resisting against a liberal
model of society, the work of the New Atheists has emerged as a response to the rise of
creationism and terrorism, as they identify with an embattled form of enlightenment
reason. They see themselves as engaged with enemies whose religious policies and
beliefs are inimical to science itself. While evolution is the ground zero of this conflict, it
has extended beyond this so that Dawkins frames the conflict between science and
religion as a battle between good - reason, in the form of scientific atheism (Dawkins
2006, 232) and evil - in the form of all religion (Dawkins 2006, 286). Dawkins
selectively draws on enlightenment ideas to reinforce his understanding of science and
reason, as well as their relationship to religion.
The Historical Roots of Dawkins' Atheism:
Dawkins means something very particular when he uses the term 'enlightenment'
-a term that he uses to refer to the ideology and development of scientific thought that
occurred during the Enlightenment and is manifested in a contemporary scientific
worldview. Dawkins' definition of science presents it as identical with reason. In
asserting that science cum reason can not only answer any and all questions but will make
the world a better place, Dawkins' sees himself as taking up the banner of the
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Enlightenment project. Drawing on their discussion of the Enlightenment, we will use the
work of historians Dorinda Outram (the Gladys I. and Franklin W. Clark Chair in History
at the University of Rochester) and Roy Porter (a British historian, who specialized in the
social history of eighteenth-century Britain and the Enlightenment and was elected to the
British Academy in 1994) to interrogate Dawkins' narrow definition of enlightenment
and call into question his uncritical acceptance of and admiration for the Enlightenment.
Although we will be using the term 'enlightenment thought' to refer to Dawkins' narrow
definition, it is important to note that this term encompasses a great diversity of thought;
such diversity in fact, that it is difficult to provide a simple, complete definition of 'the
Enlightenment'. Unlike certain agents in history such as political parties or religious
sects, the Enlightenment didn't have a formal constitution, creed, programme, or party
organization nor was it explicitly committed to some explicit -ology or -ism, as such.
There was no public charter of the Enlightenment, no party manifesto. As a movement,
the Enlightenment is amorphous, with divergent ideas and ideals, and was neither unitary,
nor was it united (Porter, 10). In her introductory book about the Enlightenment, Dorinda
Outram cautions that not only was there great diversity of thought during the period, but
that the contemporary ways of interpreting and understanding "the Enlightenment" are
many (Outram, 12). She asserts that historical study of the Enlightenment is unusual in
that it is defined as a movement in thought, rather than as historical era circumscribed by
a particular dynasty or the life of a great man. The extent to which its historical study has
been influenced by analyses inspired by philosophical inquiry is also unusual. Not only
have philosophers such as Habermas, Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as Kant and
Hegel shaped our concepts about the basic structures of enlightenment thought, they
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have also written with conviction that the Enlightenment is not a closed historical period,
but one which whether for good or ill, continues to influence the present (Outram, 12).
When considering the historical context of the Enlightenment, not only should we be
aware of significant national, regional and confessional differences in the Enlightenment
experience, but we should also consider the different Enlightenments experienced by men
and women, by Europeans and indigenous traditions. All this diversity is hardly
surprising, particularly when placed against the backdrop of the contemporary inability to
define Enlightenment in any simple, single way (Outram, 1 2).
When Richard Dawkins talks about the Enlightenment, he is referring to, and
identifying with what is commonly called 'the Enlightenment Project', a title used to
refer to the writings of a number of scientists and philosophers whose work is understood
as an attempt to create a rational, progressive and cultivated society based upon the
empirically discovered and/or logically deduced laws ofnature and human nature.
Reason/rationality are the central values of the 'Enlightenment Project', which defines
rationality as objective thinking, without passion, prejudice or superstition and without
reference to non-verifiable statements such as those of religious revelation (Outram, 1 1).
Typified by the work of Sir Frances Bacon, the Enlightenment Project is characterized by
an attitude of systematic doubt, experimentation, reliance upon first-hand experience
rather than second-hand authority and confidence in the regular order of nature (Porter,
1 7). The central belief of the Enlightenment Project is that the world has a fundamentally
rational structure and that we have sufficient rational ability to uncover this
structure. Human beings, unaided by divine revelation or intervention can and should
understand the basic structure of the universe through the application of reason.
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Supported by a belief in the fundamental unity of knowledge, these thinkers were
confident that uncovering the natural laws governing the universe using the methods of
natural science would reveal the Truth, not only about the natural world, but about human
nature, economics, and social organization etc. This perspective looked forward to
universal civilization - to recapitulate the European model - and universal emancipation.
For some, emancipation of mankind from religious tyranny would be the first blow in
general politics of emancipation, because the individual possessed by false religion could
not be in full possession of himself. Thus, for many enlightenment minds, religion in
many traditional shape or form was unacceptable (Porter, 32). This is a view explicitly
supported by Dawkins in. The God Delusion. This perspective asserts that we will lead
better lives if we exercise our reason in uncovering the rational structure of the universe
because as our knowledge becomes both broader and more unified, we will experience
continued progress (not only technologically, but also socially, politically, and morally).
As we will see in our critique of the Utopian character of his worldview, this construction
of the Enlightenment is not value free, it has strong implications for how he sees the
world, resulting in a worldview that is not necessarily wholly scientific. It is not a
'realist' perspective - it is informed by a specific Utopian ideology.
Understanding Utopianism:
It is important to note that, as with fundamentalism or the Enlightenment, there is
no singular definition of utopia. However, like those two, there are a number of shared
characteristics within the umbrella of utopianism that makes it a useful category for
discussing a variety of movements and ideologies. British political philosopher John
Gray's look at the influence of utopianism on Western thought and politics will form the
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basis of the definition that I will bring to bear in a discussion of the Utopian tendencies in
Dawkins' worldview. I9 Dawkins' Utopian tendencies are in line with what Gray calls
"modern secular utopianism." The defining characteristics of this Utopian thought
include the following elements: the anticipation of ultimate social harmony that reduces
the conflicts and shortcomings of all known societies to universal repression; the goal of
emancipation from this universal repression, after which human possibilities are limitless;
a conception of history in terms of its purpose - emancipation - rather than in terms of
cause and event; and an understanding of progress that associates advances in science
with necessary corresponding advances in ethics and morality.
The understanding of history at the center of Western Utopian thinking is strongly
informed by the enlightenment, although, like much Western thought, it has its origins in
Christianity.20 While the roots of Utopian thinking are decidedly Christian, for over 200
years - the early Christian faith in a divinely initiated end-time21 has been transformed
into the belief that Utopia could be achieved by human action (Gray 2007, 3, 9). Modern
revolutionaries, such as the French Jacobins and the Russian Bolsheviks, were informed
by the radical Enlightenment belief in a sudden break in history, after which the flaws of
human society will be forever abolished (Gray 2007, 1). Unlike these revolutionaries,
liberal humanists, like Dawkins, see history and progress as a slow incremental struggle.
In this view, as "human knowledge advances so do improvements in ethics and politics:
19 In John Gray and the Problem ofUtopia, John Hoffman asserts that Gray's definition of Utopia is overly
pessimistic and should be re-classified as the traditional definition of Utopianism, leaving room for more
productive possibilities for this concept.
20 The Christian origins of Utopianism is the central argument oí Black Mass. At this stage, it is sufficient
to show that Dawkins' worldview is informed by Enlightenment utopianism, we will come back to the
issue of Christian influence briefly in the third chapter.
21 Eschatology is the branch of theology that is concerned with the end times and includes discussions
about things such as death and judgment; Heaven and Hell; the ultimate destiny of humankind. In Judeo-
Christian theology this includes the second coming of Christ, the Apocalypse or the Last Judgment.
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progress in science will be matched by progress in society and history is a march to a
better world" (Gray 2007, 25). In The God Delusion, Dawkins asserts that the Zeitgeist
"moves on" - that there seems to be a steadily shifting standard of what is morally
acceptable. He writes that the shift is in a recognizably consistent direction, which most
of us would judge as improvement. 21 He goes on to say that even Hitler would not have
stood out in the time of Caligula or of Genghis Khan (Dawkins 2006, 268). Hitler just
seems especially evil by the more benign standards of our time (Dawkins 2006, 269).
Secular Utopian thinking incorporates the enlightenment ideal that looks forward to
universal civilization and interprets history in reductive terms, viewing technological and
economic development as primary and religion as a secondary factor of dwindling
importance (Gray 2007, 30). Dawkins and the New Atheists take this one step further,
identifying religion as the central impediment to moral progress. Dawkins specifies that
religion has nothing to do with the shift in the Zeitgeist towards greater morality, writing
that "if anything, it happens in spite of religion, not because of it" (Dawkins 2006, 268).
This is because, according to Dawkins, religious faith takes some people outside of the
"enlightened consensus of his 'moral' Zeitgeist" (Dawkins 2006, 303). Although he is
specifically talking about religious absolutists and extremists, he clearly specifies that
because "even mild and moderate religion helps to provide a climate of faith" (Dawkins
2006, 303) it is not to be tolerated.
22 Zeitgeist is literally 'the spirit of the time'. Popularized by Hegel's philosophy of history it is the idea
that society consists of a collective consciousness which moves in a distinct direction, dictating the actions
of its members. This is a concept with strong metaphysical implications. The term is used to describe the
trend of opinions, morals, thoughts, unquestioned assumptions, and other influences that belong to a
particular culture, science, or art at any point in time.
AU Utopian thinkers understand history not in terms of the causes of events, but in
terms of its purpose - the salvation of humanity. For secular Utopians, this salvation is to
be achieved exclusively through human means (Gray 2007, 5). For Dawkins, atheism (as
he defines it) is the best bet for human salvation. He asserts that while atheism might not
increase morality, humanism - the ethical system that goes along with it likely does
(Dawkins 2006, 229). Even though secular Utopian schemes are an extension of the
Enlightenment project that sought to replace religion with science, by maintaining that
the crimes of history are the result of error, Enlightenment philosophers have created a
problem of evil as impossible as any that confronts theologians (Gray 2007, 25).
Consequently, although modern thinkers try to avoid the view of history as a battle of
good and evil, secular Utopian projects cannot help but perpetuate the idea that history is
a battle between light and dark. The struggle might be between knowledge and
ignorance, or as in the case of Dawkins, reason and faith, but the understanding of the
world is the same; both views take for granted that human salvation is worked out in
history (Gray 2007, 25).
The Danger of Utopian Thinking:
The problems, limitations and dangers of Utopian thinking are commonly
neglected. While every utopia claims to embody the best life for all ofhumankind, it is
never more than one ideal among many, (Gray 2007, 52). According to Gray, the pursuit
of total harmony not only defines Utopian thought, but discloses its basic unreality (Gray
2007, 17). While defining reality is problematic at best, it is nonetheless possible to
recognize the absence of realistic goals or expectations. Utopian projects are not
constructed through ignorance, error or disinformation - they are the product of
35
worldviews that fail to take into account the world as it is, and as it has been. Given
clashes of interest between individuals and social groups, and antagonisms between
varying ideals, conflicts are endemic in every society (Gray 2007, 17). All societies
contain divergent ideals of life (Gray 2007, 53) and accordingly, it would appear that
conflict is and has long been a universal feature of human life. At the very least, it seems
natural for people to want incompatible things. However, Utopian thinkers reduce these
conflicts to insignificance so that the shortcomings of every known society represent not
flaws in human nature, but the marks of universal repression. Many continue to believe in
the enlightenment concept ofprogress - that there is nothing to stop humans from
recreating themselves and the world in which they live (Gray 2007, 19). Others, while
acknowledging the impossibility of actually achieving a perfect society, insist on the
indispensable value of Utopian imagination, suggesting that Utopian thinking opens up
otherwise closed vistas of possibility (Gray 2007, 18). According to those who accept this
view, the disastrous consequences of Utopian projects in Soviet Russia, or Maoist China,
do not flow from the projects themselves (Gray 2007, 1 8). The mass repression in
Stalinist Russia or Maoist China must be the by-product of their native traditions of
despotism (Gray 2007, 36).23As a result, Western Utopian theories are guiltless and
harmless; it is the Russian or Chinese traditions that are at fault (Gray 2007, 18).
Dawkins insists that while individual atheists might do evil things, they don't do evil in
the name of atheism whereas religious wars really are fought in the name of religion and
have been horribly frequent (Dawkins 2006, 278). This perspective completely ignores
the degree to which atheism has been an integral part of the ideology informing a number
23 Gray provides a compelling and detailed discussion demonstrating the flaws and fallacies in this line of
thought.
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of repressive and destructive regimes. State atheism has been as convenient an excuse for
crime and corruption as state religion had been. This differs greatly from the vision of
atheism that Dawkins presents in The God Delusion.
British philosopher Mary Midgley has spent much of her career strongly opposing
reductionist and scientistic ideas. Although she has responded directly to Dawkins in a
number of her works, including The Myths We Live By, I draw on her more general
critique of scientism in my critique. 24 For Dawkins atheism is a necessary corollary of a
scientific worldview. However, it's not clear what, if anything, the metaphysical position
of atheism has to do with the physical sciences. As Midgley establishes, atheism does
not actually require a scientific materialist perspective. However, materialism seems to
strike most contemporary atheists as the most straightforward justification of their claims
about the existence of God, and by making this association, their atheism draws on the
prestige and authority of 'Science' (Midgley 2004, 40). When Dawkins talks about
science, he is not limiting himself to a method of investigation; he is including in the term
'science' the entire worldview out of which the discipline originated. Dawkins has faith
in the Enlightenment's humanistic ethics as well as in its scientific discoveries. When he
talks about science, he assumes that it includes Enlightenment values and ideals that are
beyond the scope of the practice of science. Like others before him, he expects that the
scientific enterprise will necessarily include wise and responsible use of its discoveries
(Midgley 2005, 15). This Utopian perspective equates reason with science and science
with atheism and expects nothing less foundation for morality, a uniquely just basis for a
24 For exmple: Midgley, Mary. "Gene-Juggling." Philosophy, vol 54 (1979) and Midgley, Mary, Evolution
as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears (2002). Her response to Dawkins has been highly critical
and has led to a public airing of bad feeling on both sides.
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set of secular values that will replace earlier ones supplied by religion - in short, a true
and better ethic (e.g. Dawkins 2006, 229, 286, 302). Secular Utopians, like Dawkins,
anticipate that this ethic will supersede and replace the corruption and confusion of
traditional moral thinking. They fail to notice that the ethical component of this
perspective is something much wider and actually quite independent from 'science.' And
they fail to deal with the limitations inherent in the enlightenment reliance on rationality,
specifically the assumption that once released from superstition, mythology and fear,
humans possess the capacity to see solutions which are objectively correct and acceptable
to all other rational minds (Outram, 9). The problem with this way of thinking is that, in
practice, human beings do not in fact agree on what is 'rational'. 25 Since this type of
enlightenment thinking denies the validity of other ways of arriving at solutions such as
tradition, mythology or religious revelation, it becomes difficult to resolve any conflicts
without the use of force. In other words, lurking in the heart of enlightenment ideology is
political terror (Outram, 9). The role of enlightenment ideals in twentieth century terror
has been a blind spot in Western perception (Gray 2007, 36). And yet, the most
powerful Western traditions have been those that looked to transform the very nature of
human life by using the power of science - a project frequently given to violence (Gray
2007, 35). According to Gray, the terror practiced during the last century was on a scale
unequalled at any other time in history, and unlike the terror most feared today, much of
it was done in the service of secular hopes. The totalitarian regimes of the last century
have embodied some of the enlightenment's boldest dreams, and some of their worst
crimes were done in the service ofprogressive ideals (Gray 2007, 36).
25 The work of Horkheimer and Adorno on the Enlightenment is devoted to developing this critique.
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Despite consistently being presented as having the authority of science, (Gray
2007, 5) theories of progress are not scientific hypothesis. Instead, they are myths which
answer the human need for meaning (Gray 2007, 1). To suggest that the enlightenment
and science offered not reason to supplant myth, but rather new ideologies, is not to
debunk science. But it does mean that we must avoid taking its claims at face value. As
we will see in greater detail in the following chapter, science is a social activity,
performed by people with a wide variety of ideological commitments.
Chapter 2: Science and its Limits
The following chapter will analyse Dawkins' portrayal of science as the 'true'
voice of nature, a presupposition that underlies his confidence in the omnicompetence of
science. Our discussion of the social construction of scientific knowledge, the role of
interpretation in scientific theory, and the limits of the scientific method will serve to
critique his representation. As we will see, Dawkins is adamant that there is only one
valid way of understanding evolution; this reflects his view that science reveals a singular
truth. We will examine Thomas Kuhn' s model of science, which will enable a critique of
the idealized view of science Dawkins presents in The God Delusion, and then subverts
in his response to alternate theories of evolution. This chapter is not meant to be anti-
scientific, but is intended to disillusion the reader about the objectivity and vision of
transcendent truth claimed by scientists like Dawkins. It will also acquaint the reader with
science as a social activity in order to promote reasonable skepticism about the sweeping
claims that some modern scientists make about understanding human existence.
Is The Existence of God a Scientific Hypothesis?
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The central premise of The God Delusion is that the question of god's existence
can be answered using the scientific method. Dawkins maintains that "God's existence or
non-existence is a scientific fact about the universe, discoverable in principle if not in
practice" (Dawkins 2006, 50) because religion makes existence claims - claims that,
according to Dawkins, are of a clearly scientific nature; for example, miracles or the
survival of the soul. Dawkins begins the second chapter of The God Delusion with an
introduction to what he has called, "The God Hypothesis." In its simple form, this
hypothesis asserts that "there exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who
deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us"
(Dawkins 2006, 31). He later expands this definition in order to accommodate the
Abrahamic God, stating that God, "not only created the universe; he" is ^personal God
dwelling within it, or perhaps outside it (whatever that might mean) possessing the
unpleasantly human qualities to which I have alluded" (Dawkins 2006, 38). Thus, "The
God Hypothesis" proposes that "the reality we inhabit also contains a supernatural agent
who designed the universe and - at least in many versions of the hypothesis - maintains it
and even intervenes in it with miracles, which are temporary violations of his own
otherwise grandly immutable laws" (Dawkins 2006, 58). Dawkins insists that a universe
with a creative superintendent would be a very different kind of universe from one
without (Dawkins 2006, 55) and that, even if it is not easy to test in practice, in principle,
there is a fundamental difference between these two hypothetical universes (Dawkins
2006, 59). Dawkins insists that for this reason, "the presence or absence of a creative
26" I am also conscious that the Abrahamic God is (to put it mildly) aggressively male, and this
too I shall accept as a convention in my use of pronouns" (Dawkins 2006, 35).
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super-intelligence is unequivocally a scientific question" as is "the truth or falsehood of
every one of the miracle stories that religions rely upon to impress multitudes of the
faithful" (Dawkins 2006, 59).
So, is the existence of God a scientific hypothesis?
How do we Define Science?
Answering this question depends, in part, in how we define science - what
philosophers of science call the demarcation problem. James Ladyman, philosopher of
science at the University of Bristol, affirms that although one of the most fundamental
tasks for philosophers of science is to answer the question of how to distinguish genuine
science from activities or theories that merely claim to be scientific, there is no easily
accessible, simple definition of 'science' (Ladyman, 4). Many of the great scientific
achievements of the past would not necessarily fit into our contemporary classification of
science as separate and distinct from other forms of knowledge. Therefore, it is very
difficult to construct a definition of science from a historical perspective. Even if we
were to limit ourselves to a discussion of contemporary science, it is still difficult to
provide an adequate definition of science, given that different scientists can have very
different perspectives on what it means to 'do science.' These differences exist for a
number of reasons, including disciplinary differences and, technological capabilities and
can be influenced by a scientist's personal or institutional traditions, culture and
worldview. 27 Ladyman asserts that if science consists of anything, it is a method, or set
of methods (Ladyman, 4). We use the term 'scientific method' to refer to a collection of
27Some examples of the differences include questions such as, should all science be based purely on
experimentation? Some sciences use only observations, or are highly abstract and mathematical. Or, to
what degree do we assert the certainty of our findings'?
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techniques used to investigate phenomena, acquire new data, and to integrate and/or
correct previous knowledge through the formulation and testing of hypotheses. In order
TO
to be called scientific, a method of inquiry must be based on gathering empirical and
measurable evidence and subject to specific standards of reasoning. Thus, empiricism,
the attempt to construct an account of knowledge in terms of sense experience,
observation and experimentation, is frequently identified as the basis of modern science.
What distinguishes scientific knowledge from the day-to-day ways in which we
make sense of the world? 29 In everyday language, we tend to say that we know
something when we feel that we are sure of something. We often use the word 'know' to
express a personal conviction, even when our claim may, in fact, be groundless. We
believe that our claim is correct, without necessarily having verified the evidence which
supports the claim. In this context we use the word 'know' to indicate something that is
not necessarily opposed to belief, but is instead a belief that may or may not be
adequately justified. Our customary use of 'to know' is much more open than the
philosophical definition of 'knowledge' . Although a definition of 'knowledge' is the
subject of much debate, generally speaking, for a claim to count as a knowledge claim it
must be made with sincere belief in its veracity and this belief must be adequately
justified (Ladyman, 6). Knowledge is considered 'scientific knowledge' if it has been
produced using a scientific method which provides the standards for justifying, and the
means of verifying a given claim. Although there is a tendency to think of science and
the scientific method as a progressive attempt to collect and faithfully communicate
28 Empirical evidence is information derived from observation, experience, or experiment
29 Answering this question is the goal of epistemology, and a full discussion engaging all of its complexities
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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observable facts about the world, to think of science as revealing absolute truths about the
natural world is inaccurate. Science can only give us a probable knowledge about the
world around us, not certain knowledge. And as we will see, the collection of data and its
communication are contingent upon social and cultural contexts. Rejecting the idea of
absolute certainty does not undermine the pursuit of science, or what it can tell us about
the world, or the predictions it can make about natural phenomena. Even without certain
knowledge in the absolute sense, we still have hypotheses and theories that are buttressed
by empirical evidence and their ability to successfully predict phenomenon. Therefore,
we are fairly safe in suggesting that science can allow us to determine certain facts about
the universe within an interpretive framework.
Dawkins complains that some scientists and intellectuals are too eagerly
convinced that settling the question of God's existence is forever inaccessible to science
(Dawkins 2006, 48). Scientists and intellectuals such as Stephen J. Gould take the
position that science can neither affirm nor deny God's existence. Dawkins wants to
defend the view that, although science is currently agnostic about the existence of God,
this is a temporary agnosticism and will one day be answerable (Dawkins 2006, 48).
Furthermore, he rejects the position that science should be agnostic about the existence of
God because it implies that science cannot even make probability judgments about the
existence of God (Dawkins 2006, 58). Dawkins asserts that the existence of God is a
scientific question - either he exists or he doesn't - and one which we might someday
answer. In the meantime, Dawkins asserts, a strong determination can be made about
about the probability of his existence (Dawkins 2006, 48). Dawkins concludes that even
if God's existence is never proved or disproved with certainty, available evidence and
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reasoning produce an estimate about the probability of God's existence that is far less
than fifty percent (Dawkins 2006, 50).
Dawkins classifies his views on the probability of God's existence as "very low
probability but short of zero." Therefore he qualifies himself as a defacto atheist who
"cannot know for certain, but thinks that God is very improbable and lives his life on the
assumption that he is not there," although he states that he is leaning towards the 'strong
atheist' stance - atheists who know that there is no God (Dawkins 2006, 50). In this
section, he stops short of embracing the strong atheist position because as he says,
atheists don't have faith, and reason alone could not propel one to total conviction that
anything definitely doesn't exist (Dawkins 2006, 51). And yet, at the beginning of the
second chapter, he asserts that "God, defined as a super-human, supernatural intelligence
who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us, is a
delusion; and, as later chapters will show, a pernicious delusion" (Dawkins 2006, 31).
In The Selfish Delusion, Fern Elsdon-Baker argues that Dawkins is publicly
misrepresenting science in general and evolutionary theory in particular. Elsdon-Baker
identifies two different approaches used somewhat interchangeably by Dawkins to arrive
at the conclusion that god probably doesn't exist in The God Delusion - empiricism and a
a type of neo-rationalism or scientific reasoning. 30 While the two approaches are linked,
they relate to the basis of knowledge quite differently (Elsdon-Baker, 184). As we have
seen, empiricism asserts that knowledge can be based on our sense experience - we do
not need 'certain' knowledge in order to understand, or predict what might happen in the
world around us. When Dawkins uses the tenus 'rational', 'rationalist,' and
30 Although he does state that he can only say that there is probably no God, this important point sometimes
gets lost in his otherwise black and white portrayal of the relationship between science and religion.
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'rationalism,' he means 'uses reason.' This use of 'rationalism' should be distinguished
from philosophical rationalism.31 Rationalists in Dawkins' vein might argue that reason
or logical thinking has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge (Elsdon-
Baker, 180).
The problem is not that he should pick one approach or the other, as it is perfectly
feasible to be both a scientist and a rationalist. The problem is that Dawkins blurs the
boundaries between these two separate approaches so often that it is easy for the reader of
Dawkins' work to confuse 'science' and rationalism. Indeed, he so consistently conflates
them that it is not clear that he understands or values the distinction between the two.
His account of science presents it as the epitome of reason, but science is about empirical
observation as well as logic, and what appears to be the logical conclusion is not
necessarily the right one. While there are some very compelling rationalist arguments for
the probable non-existence of God, they are not based in science. Thus, the probable
non-existence of God is not a scientific fact, as Dawkins claims. Although the
investigation of miracles might be a relatively safe area of scientific inquiry, the issue of
whether or not souls survive after death is unlikely to be answered by science because
asserting that the soul does not exist is as much a statement of belief as asserting that they
do exist - we simply cannot know this empirically, just as we cannot devise any
experimental basis on which to make assertions to what happens to 'consciousness' after
death (Elsdon-Baker, 1 67). In maintaining that the existence of God is a scientific
hypothesis, Dawkins misrepresents what science can actually tell us about the world.
Dawkins seems to be confusing what he can know empirically, or even rationally, with
31 philosophers take a different approach to what 'rationalism' means and have been committed to a great
deal more, including innate or a priori ideas which are not based on experience.
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what he believes. He fails to differentiate between two separate things, atheism - which
is a personal conviction, and evolution - which is a scientific theory based on empirical
evidence. He concludes that there is probably no God based on his personal experience,
and particular worldview. This is a different kind of knowledge claim than those accepted
as scientific, reflecting a different kind of truth. Neither evolutionary theory nor science
makes any claims either way about the existence of a deity, even as it supports the theory
that natural laws are responsible for the development of new species over a vast period of
geological time. The mistake Dawkins is making is to unthinkingly accept the conclusion
that the existence of God is automatically disproved or discounted by evolutionary
theory. Dawkins is not an atheist merely because his acceptance of evolutionary theory
will not allow otherwise; Dawkins is an atheist because he believes there is no deity
(Elsdon-Baker, 168).
What does it mean to talk about the social construction of science?
Dawkins' book presents science as though it consists of the application of an unchanging
technique called the scientific method, treating 'science' as a simple, consistent object
that will one day give us a complete account of things. In this view, the world presents
itself in a given, static form which is faithfully captured using the methods of science.
To critique this perspective is not to descend into obscure relativism, nor is it say
that there aren't facts of matter independent of culture. Rather it is a recognition that
when we make statements of fact, those statements belong to our culture. They come
from our linguistic conventions - our views about space and time are embedded in
language. Language informs our experience and perception such that these are cultural
products themselves. While there is a world outside of us, a material reality independent
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of our thoughts and our language, when we seek to understand it, when we start to
interpret and represent that world to ourselves and others, we're talking about cultural
entities. The reality of the external world is always mediated by cultural concepts, which
is what is meant by "social construction of knowledge." These are the ways in which the
methods, styles, preferred regimes of science etc. are thoroughly embedded in their social
and cultural contexts.
Richard Lewontin, an American evolutionary biologist and geneticist, is critical of
the view that the methods, institutions, and vast body of knowledge that we call "science"
somehow stand outside of society; that the scientific method is objective, nonpolitical and
true for all time; and that the product of science is claimed as a kind of universal Truth
(Lewontin, 8). He asserts that "science" is a social institution, completely integrated into
and influenced by all other social institutions (Lewontin, 3). Scientists, he notes, are
social beings, immersed in a family, a state, and a productive structure, all of which
contribute to and mold their worldviews (Lewontin, 3).
There is also a reciprocating exchange between science and other social
institutions. On the one hand, social institutions influence science, both in its practice,
and in how we think about it. On the other hand, these institutions appropriate the
scientific concepts and ideas that support their existence, and make them seem legitimate
and natural (Lewontin, 4). To take it one step further, work in biology, especially
biomedicine, is broadening our understanding of the relationship between science and
society. There is growing evidence demonstrating that culture doesn't just interpret
human biology, but also shapes it. Thus, human biology is not a universal constant but is
actively shaped at the material level by the way people live. Recent research in
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epigenetics32 is changing our understanding of the ways in which genes communicate.
Rather than entirely active agents driving cellular life, they exist in a dynamic
interchange with their environments, giving and taking, sometimes expressed and
sometimes not. As the relationship between science and society is reexamined and
expanded, the sciences are becoming understood as inherently social. Scientific
knowledge is a human product that is both constructed and maintained. The cultural
embedding of science is not inconsequential. Reading our social arrangements into the
natural world not only colours what we perceive in nature, but influences the questions
that science takes up in the first place. It determines what it considers worth doing, and
determines the values of science.
Sometimes the relationship between social experience and scientific theory are
easy to trace, particularly in the way in which a scientific theory is a direct translation of
social experience. Even Darwin's explanation of evolution was influenced by his social
context. In examining the issue, we accept that the process Darwin described is real and
functions as he describes it. But his explanation of this process is clearly influenced by
his social context (Lewontin, 10). Lewontin asserts that Darwin took early nineteenth-
century political economy and expanded it to include all of natural economy. Darwin
claimed that there was a universal struggle for existence because more organisms were .
born than could survive and reproduce, and that in the struggle for existence, those
organisms who were more efficient, better designed, cleverer, and generally better
equipped for the struggle would leave more offspring than the inferior kinds. As a
consequence of this victory in the struggle for existence, evolutionary change occurred.
32 A little more on this later in the chapter
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Darwin himself was conscious of the source of his ideas about the struggle for existence,
stating that the idea for evolution by natural selection occurred to him after reading the
famous Essay on Population by Thomas Malthus. Lewontin claims that his theory of
natural selection bears an uncanny resemblance to the early capitalist economic theory
developed by the Scottish economists (Lewontin, 10). Furthermore, his view of sexual
selection reflected the standard Victorian view of the relationship between middle-class
men and women (Lewontin, 10). Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, an anthropologist and evolutionary
scientist, has shown how romantic ideas of femininity and motherhood skewed the
interpretation of evolutionary science, arguing that Victorian naturalists looked to nature
to justify assigning female animals the same qualities that patriarchal cultures have
almost always ascribed to 'good' mothers (nurturing and passive). Women were
assumed to be 'naturally' what patriarchal cultures would socialize them to be: modest,
compliant, non-competitive and sexually reserved (Hrdy, xiv). Another evolutionary
biologist, Joan Roughgarder, argues that Darwin's understanding of the rules of natural
selection was distorted by Victorian sexual stereotypes, not least in the suggestion that
'social life in animals consist(s) of discreetly discerning damsels seeking horny,
handsome, healthy warriors.' She argues that there is far greater sexual diversity in the
natural world and among humans than Darwin's cultural bias allowed him to recognize
(Roughgarden, 167). Most of the ideological influence from society that permeates
science is a great deal more subtle, coming in the form of basic assumptions of which
scientists themselves are usually not aware, yet which have profound effect on the way in
which the 'facts' of science are interpreted and theories are explained This is inevitable,
49
and Dawkins is not unique in doing this. But a problem arises when this bias is smuggled
in uncritically.
Thomas Kuhn and Rethinking the Practice of Science:
Thomas Kuhn' s discussion of science gives us the ability to appraise the role of
cultural influences (social, political, religious and institutional) on the development of
science without necessarily reducing the explanatory value of the sciences. In short,
Kuhn's work allows us to consider the influence of a scientist's worldview on his work.
Dawkins' representation of science has remained static - he perpetuates a public image
of science that is much the same as the public image of science in 1962 when Thomas
Kuhn wrote The Structure ofScientific Revolutions. Dawkins subscribes to what Kuhn
refers to as 'the received view of science." This way of understanding science has seven
key characteristics. It holds that science is cumulative, it's progress the result of a steady
accumulation of knowledge over time; that science is unified, in the sense that there is a
single set of fundamental methods for all the sciences and that because everything in the
world is made of the same basic stuff in complex combinations, the laws of biology ought
to be derivable from those of chemistry, and the laws of chemistry from the laws of
physics; that context is of no importance, with questions such as 'who made a particular
observation' or 'for what reason' being irrelevant to the issue of whether and how
observations provide evidence for a theory; that there is an underlying logic of
confirmation or falsification implicit in all scientific evaluations of the evidence for a
given hypothesis and that these evaluations are value free, in the sense ofbeing
independent of the personal, non-scientific views and allegiances of scientists; that there
is a sharp distinction between scientific theories and other kinds of beliefs systems; that
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there is a sharp distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms as well as
between theoretical statements and those that describe the results of experiments; that
observation and experiment is a neutral foundation of scientific knowledge, or at least for
the testing of scientific theories; and finally, that scientific terms have fixed and precise
meanings (Ladyman, 95).
By applying the methods and tools of history to science, Kuhn revealed a very
different concept of science, one that helps describe and critique the image of science
perpetuated by Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion. As far as Dawkins is concerned
science is the wholly objective handmaiden of truth - a truth that transcends society,
culture and to some extent history. This idealized view ignores how scientists, and those
who study the sciences, actually perceive that activity of science. Science is a dynamic
process, not a static one.
Originally published as an essay, Kuhn' s work was an attempt to demonstrate that
we have been misled in fundamental ways in the image we have of science, leading many
to question the rationality and objectivity of science. While there are a number of
criticisms of this text, it has almost certainly led to near universal reappraisal of the way
we understand scientific knowledge and the history of science (Elsdon-Baker, 203).
Kuhn was a physicist who became interested in the history of science, especially as it
pertained to the Copernican revolution. The standard view of scientific revolutions
presented in textbooks, as well as historical and philosophical works presented the
Copernican revolution as a battle between reason and experiment on one side and
superstition and religious dogma on the other (Ladyman, 96). Kuhn saw this presentation
as an oversimplification, and argued that this history of scientific revolutions was
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incompatible with the scientific method (Ladyman, 96). The Structure ofScientific
Revolutions provided a fundamentally different way of thinking about scientific
methodology and knowledge. His essay radically altered the practice of the history of
science by demonstrating that scientists' accounts of the history of their subject distort
the actual processes of change and development in scientific thought. Given that they are
intended to motivate and justify contemporary theories, traditional accounts serve a
pedagogical and ideological function rather than providing an accurate history. This
distorted image of science as the steady accumulation of knowledge and of scientific
revolutions as the triumph of reason over superstition is generally constructed and
transmitted through the classrooms and textbooks from which each new generation of
scientist learns its trade (Kuhn, 1). Kuhn's work made some radical claims about
scientific knowledge - specifically, his work demonstrates that although observation and
experimentation constrain scientific beliefs, they do not determine them.
Kuhn's work is invaluable to a critique of Dawkins' representation of science,
because it demonstrates that science is not, nor has it ever been, capable of a perfect,
objective account of nature. Science is practiced by people according to how they see the
world, an understanding that contrasts sharply with Dawkins' view which suggests that
the opposite is true - that the objective truth of the world dictates the practice of science.
Kuhn demonstrated that views of nature held in the past are neither less scientific nor
more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those held today, that out of date theories
are not in principle unscientific because they have been discarded (Kuhn, 2). In so doing,
his work seriously undermines the model of a historic and necessary conflict between
science and religion.
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In The Structures ofScientific Revolutions, Kuhn demonstrates that scientific
revolutions are not the result of truth and reason overcoming superstition and unscientific
theories. Rather, scientific revolutions are the result of a 'paradigm shift' - a
transformation of scientific thought so broad and so profound that it amounts to a
transformation of the world within which scientific work is done (Kuhn, 6). He writes
that "(t)he early developmental stage of most sciences have been characterized by
continual competition between a number of distinct views of nature each partially derived
from, and all roughly compatible with the dictates of scientific observation and method.
What differentiated these various schools was not one or another failure of method - they
were all scientific, but what we shall come to call their incommensurable^ ways of
seeing the world and of practicing science in it" (Kuhn, 4). Kuhn argues that every
scientific community functions within a given paradigm j4 or model of scientific thinking,
and that each scientific revolution, large or small, requires that the scientific community
reject a time-honoured scientific theory in favour of new theories and models that are
fundamentally incompatible with the old ways of understanding the world (Kuhn, 6).
Kuhn's description of scientific revolutions is as follows: before there is a central
paradigm, there is a fact gathering phase during which a paradigm emerges. This occurs
when texts are published by more than one scientist that define the discipline or field.
Scientists whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same
standards and rules of scientific practice (Kuhn, 7). Kuhn states that "paradigms provide
scientists not only with a map, but also with some of the directions essential for
33 meaning lacking a common measure or standard of comparison. Observed evidence can appear different
to members of different paradigms.
34 One of the most fundamental concepts in Kuhn's philosophy is that of the paradigm - the overarching
theories and conceptual frameworks of a scientific discipline.
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mapmaking." That is to say that a paradigm provides the standards by which a given
research tradition determines not only what should count as an admissible problem for
scientific scrutiny but also which solutions are legitimate (Kuhn, 1 09). In learning a
paradigm, the scientist acquires the theory, methods and standards ofthat research
tradition. Commitment to these three inextricably linked aspects - and the consensus
produced within a scientific community by that commitment - are pre-requisites for the
foundation and continuation of a particular research tradition (Kuhn, 11). The science
that occurs within a particular scientific paradigm fits the traditional public image of
science, which Kuhn refers to as 'normal science.'
The aim of normal science is the steady extension of the scope and precision of
scientific knowledge. (Kuhn, 52). It is a highly cumulative enterprise with research firmly
based on one or more past scientific achievements that the scientific community
acknowledges (for a time) as supplying the foundation of its future practices (Kuhn, 10).
In all these respects, it fits the usual image of scientific work with great precision.
However, one standard aspect of the popular image of the scientific enterprise is missing.
Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory. When it is successful, it finds
none (Kuhn, 52). Kuhn is very critical of Popper's theory of falsification, according to
which scientists should and do abandon any refuted theory. He asserts that it is just not
the case that the knowledge of falsifying instances is enough to make most scientists
35 There are two distinct types of scientific thought in Kuhn's model: normal science which is
fundamentally conservative and tradition bound; and extraordinary science, which is fundamentally
innovative.
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abandon their cherished theories . Normal science is predicated on the assumption that
the scientific community knows what the world is really like (Kuhn, 5); its success is a
result of the community's willingness to defend that assumption. For this reason, normal
science often suppresses fundamental novelties because they are unavoidably subversive
of its basic commitments (Kuhn, 5). Researchers are succesful only when they collect
further evidence to support the paradigm. They use the paradigm as a predictive model
and work out new applications for it. Although normal science tends to reify and
maintain the status quo within which it operates, it will eventually produce anomalies that
the current paradigm cannot account for. These anomalies put stress on the paradigm,
with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations
that govern normal science (Kuhn, 52). When the scientific profession can no longer
avoid the anomalies that challenge the existing traditions of scientific practice, some
members of the scientific community begin what Kuhn calls 'extraordinary science' -
which begins with an investigation of the area of anomaly and closes only when the
paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the expected
(Kuhn, 52). The explorations of extraordinary science lead the profession to a new set of
commitments that will form the new basis for the practice of science (Kuhn, 6).
Scientific revolutions are the very rare, tradition-shattering complements to the
tradition bound activity of normal science (Kuhn, 6). As the science that occurs during
scientific revolution, extraordinary science is the theoretical and practical work that
proposes radically new ways of seeing the world. How a scientist sees the world - their
36 Note that although this is one of Dawkins' most strongly valued virtues of science, especially as it
contrasts with religion, he is actively engaged in suppressing or reinterpreting alternate ways of thinking
when it comes to his theory of evolution.
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scientific worldview - is determined jointly by the environment and the particular
normal-scientific tradition they were trained in as a student. At times of revolution, when
the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perception of his or her
environment must be re-educated. In some familiar situations the scientist must even
learn to see a new gestalt (Kuhn, 1 12). 37 However, scientists are unlikely to attest
directly to the perceptual changes that accompany paradigm shifts. As Kuhn writes, a
convert to the Copernican worldview does not say ? used to see a planet but now I see a
satellite' when looking at the moon. This statement implies a sense in which the
Ptolemaic system had once been correct, that at one time, the moon was a planet.
Instead, a convert to the new astronomy says, ? once took the moon to be (or saw the
moon as a planet) but I was mistaken' (Kuhn, 114).
Kuhn notes that many readers will be inclined to suggest that what changes with a
paradigm is only the scientists' interpretation of observations, while the observations
themselves are fixed once and for all by the nature of the environment and of the
perceptual apparatus (Kuhn, 120). However, what occurs during a scientific revolution
cannot be not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of individual and stable empirical
evidence. More importantly, the process by which either the individual or the community
makes the transition between paradigms does not resemble interpretation as much as it
does conversion (Kuhn, 121). Scientific fact and theory are not categorically separable,
except perhaps within a single tradition of normal-science practice. The unexpected
discovery is not simply factually important, the scientist's world is qualitatively
37 German for form, configuration, or appearance, designates a whole that recognizably has parts, but can
only be experienced as an indivisible unity. A classic example of this is the popular image that can be seen
as either a vase, or an old woman's face.
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transformed as well as quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of either fact or
theory (Kuhn, 7). Theories do fit the facts, but new theories can only account for
previously existing evidence by transforming it into a fact that did not exist at all for the
preceding paradigm.
A perfect example is found in the shift from Ptolemaic to Copernican astrology.
Copernican astrology still accounts for the empirical fact of the moon's existence, but it
is now a satellite, an object that did not exist in the previous paradigm. This means that
theories do not evolve piecemeal to fit facts that were always in existence. Rather they
emerge together with the facts, or facts emerge together with theories. Theories are
developed and articulated according to how people see the world and not the other way
around (Kuhn, 141 ). Thus scientific knowledge is not simply a product of gathering new,
objective facts. It is also influenced by the cultural and social environments in which
scientists work.
All scientists are working within a given paradigm. And like all individuals,
scientists have a worldview, although not all scientists have the same worldview. Their
worldview influences how they do science, not only determining what kinds of questions
they ask, but also what data they deem to be significant, and more importantly, how they
interpret that data. Scientific interpretation is bounded by the conventions of the scientific
method and the consensus of one's peers. However, while the scientific community
might agree on a fact of science, such as the existence of the moon or evolution, there are
divergent views on what these facts mean. This does not mean that we have to downplay
the role of science as a way ofunderstanding the world around us. It does mean,
however, that we cannot assume that scientific knowledge is based on 'absolute fact' or
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'truth' but should concede that it is more like a model of best fit that can change with our
understanding of the world - although not easily.
Dawkins' Paradigm:
Dawkins is a contemporary neo-Darwinist. However, rather than providing a true
account of evolution, Dawkins is actually describing his view of neo-Darwinian
evolution. Elsdon-Baker argues that, in his work, Dawkins' approach to evolutionary
science, intentionally or otherwise, has come to dominate the public perception of
evolutionary science. In The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins explains that he wants to
persuade the reader, not only that the Darwinian world view happens to be true, but that it
is the only known theory that could, in principle, solve the mystery of our existence
(Dawkins 2006, xvi). Although his "selfish gene" theory is presented as purified and
concentrated Darwinism, reduced to its very essence, this work differs from Darwin's
description of evolution in some significant ways. The central argument of his book, The
Selfish Gene, for instance, is that evolution is all about the natural selection of genes, and
genes alone take Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection to its logical
conclusion according the Dawkins (Elsdon-Baker,7). Dawkins defines this view in
Skeptic Magazine as follows: "Darwinism is the differential survival of self-replicating
genes in a gene pool, usually as manifested by individual behavior, morphology, and
phenotypes" (Miele, 82). Yet, as Elsdon-Baker asserts, Darwin himself had no notion of
'the differential survival of self-replicating genes in a gene pool.' Furthermore, Dawkins
and Darwin identify a different unit of selection; Dawkins cites the gene, while for
Darwin, it is the individual organism. Dawkins' idea of natural selection hinges the
survival of the gene, whereas Darwin's version is based on the transmission of variation
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(Elsdon-Baker,103). Like neo-Darwinists before him, Dawkins has conflated his own
ideas with Darwinism.
The term neo-Darwinian was originally coined by Darwin's friend George
Romanes in the early 1 890s as a slightly derogatory term to describe the theories of
Wallace and Weismann (Elsdon-Baker,99) .38 Wallace's book Darwinism published in
1889 outlines his version of 'pure' Darwinism, and it is this version of Darwinism that we
tend to think of today, one that is wholly reliant on natural selection with no role for the
inheritance of acquired characters (Elsdon-Baker,108). Neo-Darwinism is a hybridized
approach to evolution that is only partly based on Darwin's ideas. Wallace provided the
idea of natural selection and, like contemporary neo-Darwinists, was a strict selectionist,
while Weismann apparently introduced the idea of the isolation of the germ line,
invalidating any other method of evolution but natural selection. It is because Wallace
and Weismann's ideas were not strictly Darwinian that they were called «eo-Darwinian
(Elsdon-Baker, 104). While the concept of evolution was not new when Darwin
published On the Origin ofSpecies, his theory was innovative in two key ways. First, his
assertion that life has evolved gradually over time. And second, he proposed natural
selection 39 as the method by which evolution occurred. Although the theory of evolution
quickly became orthodox, evolution by means of natural selection (Darwinism), was
subject to critique from a number of competing evolutionary theories - some of which
38 Alfred Rüssel Wallace, OM, FRS (8 January 1823-7 November 1913) was a British naturalist, explorer,
geographer, anthropologist and biologist. He is best known for independently proposing a theory of
evolution due to natural selection that prompted Charles Darwin to publish his own theory. Friedrich
Leopold August Weismann (Frankfurt am Main, 17 January 1834 - Freiburg, 5 November 1914) was a
German evolutionary biologist. Ernst Mayr ranked him the second most notable evolutionary theorist of the
19th century, after Charles Darwin. Weismann became the Director of the Zoological Institute and the first
Professor of Zoology at Freiburg.
39 The differential survival and reproduction of organisms with genetic characteristics that enable them to
better utilize environmental resources.
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significantly downplayed the role of natural selection or saw it as less important than
other progressionist mechanisms (Elsdon-Baker,84). Evolution by means of natural
selection was disputed on the grounds that Darwin hadn't provided evidence showing
how the inheritance of beneficial traits actually happened, or how these differences might
be sustained and strengthened through the generations instead of simply blending in with
the larger population (Eldson-Baker,4). It wasn't until the 1930s that developments in
genetics fully addressed these concerns, producing what is commonly called the modern
synthesis. 40 Dawkins and others also refer to the joining of genetics and evolution by
natural selection as the 'neo-Darwinian' synthesis. The synthesis seemed so logical and
powerful that soon natural selection of genetic variations was seen as the only possible
method of evolution (Eldson-Baker,6). Stephen J. Gould refers to this as the hardening of
the modern-synthesis, which became even more rigid in the 1960s when the gene (rather
than groups within species or individual organisms) was identified as the level at which
selection occurs (Eldson-Baker,6). Thus, it is misleading of neo-Darwinists to claim that
the modern synthesis of genetics and natural selection is 'pure Darwinism.' Indeed, as
Elsdon-Baker indicates, it's not just that Darwin didn't know about genes, but his
conception of natural selection is significantly different than that of the neo-Darwinists.
The rigid natural selectionism that we associate with orthodox Darwinism is Wallace's
development and this involved rejecting some of Darwin's own ideas (Elsdon-Baker,99).
Darwin began developing the concept of pangenesis - a particulate process that, as well
as accounting for adaptation by natural selection, also allowed for use and disuse, and for
40 Mendel's work on genetics provided a partial solution to this problem, but the either/or, stop-start nature
of genetic inheritance seemed at odds with the gradualism that was needed to explain evolution by natural
selection. The work of J.B.S. Haldane, Sewall Wright and Ronald Aylmer Fisher in the 1920's and '3Os
provided the necessary resolution (Eldson-Baker.5)
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an organism's environment to play a major part in its evolution - almost as early as he
began developing the idea of natural selection. 4I Furthermore, as current trends in
research change, it is just possible that Darwin's ideas of pangenesis might not have been
so far off the mark as the neo-Darwinists assume (Elsdon-Baker, 94).
No matter how compelling and forceful his presentation is, it is important to keep
in mind that Dawkins' approach is just one of the many avenues of thinking on evolution.
He frames the ongoing discussion as part of the conflict between evolution and
creationism and takes a speculative, combative approach that will be familiar to readers
of The God Delusion (Eldson-Baker, 16). He maintains that current debates in
evolutionary biology that challenge the notion of evolution working solely by natural
selection of genes are challenges to Darwinism (Elsdon-Baker, 104). In fact, they are
challenges to «eo-Darwinism. The concept of pangenesis demonstrates that Darwin was
far from the pure natural selectionist that neo-Darwinists often assume he was (Elsdon-
Baker,95). It is neo-Darwinism which holds at its heart the doctrine that there can be no
impact from the environment on any unit of heredity (Elsdon-Baker, 106). For neo-
41 Pangenesis was Darwin's, entirely speculative, concept of how inheritance might occur. Darwin
proposed countless minute particles which he called 'gemmules' that are released by each part of an
organism at every stage of its development. Each gemmule could reproduce an exact copy of the part from
which it was released. They must have a natural affinity which drew them together from all corners of the
body to the sexual organs, or the areas where asexual reproduction took place. They not only played a part
in the production of the next generation, but 'latent gemmules' could lie dormant and intact in order to be
transmitted to future generations (Elsdon-Baker, 92). The concept had to involve particles that preserve
variation from generation to generation; particles are also needed to solve the problem ofatavism - the
reappearance ofancestral traits several generations later. His concept contrasts with modern classical
genetics in three significant ways. In the first place, in modern classical genetics, the body cells are
separate from the germ cells involved in reproduction, so only the information in germ cells is actually ever
used to make a new organism. Secondarily, Darwin didn't propose any mathematical laws to describe how
different gemmules might be expressed - an essential feature ofmodern genetics. Lastly, pangenesis
allows for a number of kinds of inheritance of acquired characteristics because gemmules could be
developed and released during an organisms life in response to changing conditions. This contrasts entirely
with genetic theory in which the genes involved in reproduction are never altered from generation to
generation, they are merely exchanged during sexual reproduction or mutated during the reproductive
process (Elsdon-Baker, 93).
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Darwinists, evolution can only take place through mutations in the heritable material of
sex cells - what we currently think of as genetic material. Following the discovery of
DNA, neo-Darwinists subscribed to the 'central dogma' of molecular biology introduced
by Crick, believing that information could only be transferred from DNA to protein, and
never be transferred from protein to DNA. The suggestion that the environment might
have an impact on the genotype,42 might seriously weaken Dawkins' singular vision of
the selfish gene theory of evolution (Eldson-Baker, 1 8). However, there has always been a
contingent of evolutionary scientists who believed that the dogmatic neo-Darwinian line
was misplaced and new research is supporting this perspective (Elsdon-Baker, 13).
The most recent empirical research is blurring and complicating the apparently
inexorable logic of the selfish gene vision. Elsdon-Baker asserts that "(t)he shift has been
so dramatic that I do not know of many practicing evolutionary biologists who are now
committed 'gene centrists' in the Dawkins mould" (Elsdon-Baker, 1 1). The role of genes
has turned out to be far more ambiguous than previously imagined (Elsdon-Baker, 10).
The developing science of epigenetics may be showing how DNA may be bypassed
altogether, enabling traits to be passed on "epi-genetically" - that is, outside the genes. 43
If this is the case, then the gene-centric view of many neo-Darwinists might start to look
rather outdated (Elsdon-Baker, 1 1 9). Epigenetics may well be another key evolutionary
mechanism, working in tandem with mutation and natural selection. Horizontal gene
transfer is a new area of research that is also calling the narrow confines of the selfish
42 The genetic makeup, as distinguished from the physical appearance, of an organism or a group of
organisms.
43 The focus and meaning ofepigenetics have both changed substantially since its inception in the 1940s by
Conrad H. Waddington. Modern biologists disagree about precisely what it does mean but the core of the
science is how genes are expressed - that is, just what effect the genes have on the organism.
Epigeneticists talk about how particular genes may be 'marked', or switched on and off. (Elsdon-
Baker. 11 9).
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gene hypothesis into question. Horizontal gene transfer is the transmission of genetic
elements sideways between individuals of the same generation rather than down the
generations through the process of reproduction. Most interestingly, this kind of transfer
can happen between organisms of vastly different species. These new genetic elements
can then be passed down the generations via the usual process of reproduction (Elsdon-
Baker, 133).
With their theory of evolution through punctuated equilibrium, Stephen Jay Gould
and his supporters have provided one of the longest running and highest profile
challenges to the Dawkins' supremacy. 44 Punctuated equilibrium envisages long periods
of stability during which species changed little, occasionally interrupted by sudden (on
the geological time scale) shifts to new species or range of species. Gould asserted that
the fossil record shows that life, while becoming more diverse in terms of species, has
44 Gould and Dawkins have famously clashed on a number of issues, including their interpretations of
evolutionary theory and their understanding of the relationship between religions and science. Philosopher
of biology, Kim Sterelny published, Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival ofthe Fittest detailing and analysing their
differing views on evolution specifically and science more broadly, looking at the ways it informs their
views on its application with respect to socio-biology. Sterelny suggests that "one sharp contrast between
Dawkins and Gould is on the application of science in general, and evolutionary biology in particular, to
our species" (162). While Dawkins is "fully committed to the idea that we can understand ourselves only
in an evolutionary framework," (164-165) Gould rejects sociobiology. Sterelny speculates that the
tendency "not to emphasise the importance of development and history in imposing constraints on
adaptation, the problems in translating microevolutionary change into species-level change, the role of
contingency and mass extinction in reshaping evolving lineages, or the importance of paleobiology to
evolutionary biology likely played a part in Gould's hostility" (166), but notes that according to Gould the
ideas of sociobiology are "dangerous and ill-motivated as well as wrong. They smack of hubris, of science
moving beyond its proper domain, and incautiously at that" (166). In Rocks ofAges, Gould sought to
address the relationship between religion and science with his NOMA theory. He proposes this theory of
Non-overlapping magesteria as "a blessedly simple and entirely conventional resolution to ... the supposed
conflict between science and religion." (Gould 1999, 3). He defines magesteria as "a domain where one
form of teaching holds the appropriate tools for meaningful discourse and resolution"(Gould 1999, 5)and
describes the NOMA principle as "the magisterium of science covers the empirical realm: what the
Universe is made of (fact) and why does it work in this way (theory). The magisterium of religion extends
over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value. These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they
encompass all inquiry (consider, for example, the magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty)." (Gould
1999, 6). Many, including Orr, have admired the sentiment underlying Gould's proposal but have rejected
it for being too simplistic in creating an artificially separation between the two that is too often blurred in
practice for it to be very useful. Not surprisingly, Dawkins rejects NOMA completely.
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actually become less varied in its range of basic forms since the first explosion of multi-
cellular life (Gould 2002). Furthermore, he and Niles Eldredge argued that the fossil
record demonstrates that species show very little change from the first time they appear in
the record to the time they disappear. Also, from time to time throughout the long history
of the earth, huge numbers of species disappear and new ones appear in events called
'mass extinctions.' Gould argued that such events played a huge part in the evolution of
new species. According to them, evolution appears to jump from one species to another
with long periods of stability in between - in complete contrast to the gradual but
continuous change of the neo-Darwinian model (Gould 2002). According to Gould, the
neo-Darwinian view envisaged a gradual process of improving adaptation, increasing
complexity and variety through natural selection over the entire span of life on earth -
frequently interrupted by catastrophes such as meteorite impacts, but essentially moving
on all the time (Elsdon-Baker, 129). For Dawkins, the development of life through
evolution is entirely about natural selection of genes (Dawkins Selfish 2006). The few
random mutations that improve survival thrive, and those that do not are eliminated.
Through the gradual change in genes, driven by natural selection, population or lineages
become adapted to their physical circumstances (Elsdon-Baker, 128). Alternatively,
Gould asserted that evolution happened not at the level of the gene, but at the level of the
species, citing the fossil record as evidence. Dawkins responded in, The Blind
Watchmaker, that the punctuated equilibrium is a 'minor gloss' an 'interesting but minor
wrinkle on the surface of neo-Darwinism and that it lies firmly within the neo-Darwinian
synthesis.' But this was adamantly denied by Gould and Eldredge without rejecting
Darwinian evolution, as Gould was an ardent Darwinist (Elsdon-Baker, 130). Gould
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suggested that the range of evolutionary possibilities is limited by some as yet unknown
mechanism that is consistent with Darwinian evolution (Gould 2002). This mechanism
would explain why evolution has been conservative for long periods. Evolutionary
development biology (evo-devo) is demonstrating that the standard picture of natural
selection weeding out any traits which are not helpful and encouraging those that are is
inadequate. Biologists are beginning to see that the process is much more complex than
that. Toolkit genes (genes that code for the development of an organism) and an
organism's development are both subject to an elaborate web of non-linear interactions
and feedback mechanisms as though organisms develops in constant conversation with
themselves (Elsdon-Baker, 141). There is some evidence that organisms actively
influence their own evolution through some proteins. There is also some evidence that,
as a result of these feedback loops, evolution can be sudden rather than gradual. Research
in this field might well provide the as-yet missing mechanism that will support Gould and
Eldrege's picture of sudden spurts of evolution (Elsdon-Baker, 141). All these
developments are showing that evolution may be far, far more complicated than the neo-
Darwinian synthesis allows. It may be that the idea of evolution solely or predominantly
by means of natural selection has to be rethought. And yet, Dawkins is adamant that
there is only one valid way ofunderstanding evolution. This is neo-Darwinian
imperialism. What they promoted as scientific thinking was actually a series of un-
criticised ideologies.
Dawkins' Account of the Biological Roots of Religion:
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Given that Dawkins' research background is in ethology, it is not surprising that
he did not limit his 'selfish gene' based theory of evolution exclusively to physical traits,
but extended it to include the evolution ofbehaviour. Following his logic, if animals
evolve, so must their behaviour, and, gene selection has been a very successful way of
explaining some otherwise inexplicable patterns of behavior. Furthermore, if this theory
is applicable to animals, it must also be applicable to humans (Eldson-Baker,14).
Although Dawkins' claims that he is discussing the biological roots of religion, his work
falls under the more controversial umbrella of sociobiology. According to Dawkins,
morality and religious behavior are universal, and "universal features of a species
demand a Darwinian explanation" (Dawkins 2006, 166). Dawkins asserts that, although
there are some other theories on the origin of religion which might hold some
psychological truth, they miss the point of Darwinian explanations (Dawkins 2006,
168).46 In order to distinguish what he means by a Darwinian explanation, Dawkins
introduces the concept ofproximate and ultimate explanations, roughly, explanations of
the how, and the why of a phenomenon, stating that Darwinian thinkers are interested in
ultimate explanations.47 While a possible proximate explanation of religion would
¦"Ethology: is a branch of zoology concerned with the study of animal behavior. Ethologists take a
comparative approach, studying behaviors ranging from kinship, cooperation, and parental investment, to
conflict, sexual selection, and aggression across a variety of species.
46Such as: it, "gives consolation and comfort; fosters togetherness in groups; satisfies yearning to
understand why we exist" (Dawkins, 163)
47 As we have seen, Dawkins' understanding of evolution is not the only possible way ofunderstanding
Darwin's theory or evolution more broadly, however, throughout the following section, when we discuss
Dawkins' ideas, we will use evolutionary terms as Dawkins defines them. Dawkins explains the distinction
between proximate and ultimate explanations as follows: "The proximate explanation for the explosion in
the cylinder of an internal combustion engine invokes the sparking plug. The ultimate explanation
concerns the purpose for which the explosion was designed: to impel a piston from the cylinder, thereby
turning a crankshaft" (Dawkins, 168). Dawkins is careful to be clear that "the Darwinian ultimate question
is not a better question, not a more profound question, not a more scientific question than the neurological
proximate question. But it is not the one that I am talking about here (Dawkins, 1 69). He does not make
these caveats about any of the other theories with a less clear basis in the 'pure' sciences.
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probably be a neurological explanation, an ultimate explanation would involve explaining
the existence of this neurological function in terms of evolutionary theory. As Dawkins
puts it, "even if neurologists were to locate a 'god center'48 in the brain, Darwinians, like
me, will want to understand the selection pressure that favoured it" (Dawkins 2006, 168).
Thus, Darwinians, like himself are not satisfied what they consider to be explanations
that do not engage with the more fundamental evolutionary factors. In response to
political explanations that identify religion as a tool used by the ruling class to subjugate
the underclass, the Darwinian thinker would want to know why people are vulnerable to
the charms of religion and therefore open to exploitation (Dawkins 2006, 169). In order
to develop a Darwinian explanation for religion, Dawkins asks "what pressure or
pressures exerted by natural selection originally favoured the impulse to religion?"
(Dawkins 2006, 163).
Dawkins begins his evolutionary explanation by introducing the "standard
Darwinian consideration of economy" as one of the central principles of natural selection,
stating that "ruthless utilitarianism trumps even if it doesn't always seem that way"
(Dawkins 2006, 163). Thus, for Dawkins, the persistence of religion is particularly
problematic because "religion is wasteful and extravagant and Darwinian selection
targets and eliminates waste" (Dawkins 2006, 163). In order to demonstrate that this
seeming wastefulness does not disqualify religion from Darwinian explanation, he
provides a number of examples of seemingly frivolous behavioral or physical adaptations
which actually benefit the survival of an individual's genes (mating rituals, a peacock's
48 Some scientists hope use neurology to locate and identify the portions of the brain that are responsible for
mystical, religious experiences, this, or these areas are referred to as the 'god centre' in the brain.
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tail and "anting")49 (Dawkins 2006, 163) and introduces what I would call the central
assumption of Darwinian explanation: given that Darwinian logic dictates that natural
selection "punishes wastage of time and energy," if a behavioral or physical adaptation
persists, Darwinians will presume with great confidence that it is 'for' something,
because if the adaptation wasn't "positively useful for survival and reproduction, natural
selection would long ago have favoured individuals who refrained from it" (Dawkins
2006, 163). Thus, in the specific case of anting, although there is currently no consensus
on the purpose of this behavior, Darwinians assume that it serves some significant
purpose and that "if birds didn't do it, their statistical prospects of genetic success would
be damaged" (Dawkins 2006, 163).
Although one might be tempted to draw a parallel between anting and religion -
just like anting, religion persists although it costs time, energy and resource and there is,
as yet no, consensus with respect to its evolutionary function - Dawkins insists that they
are not comparable because religion is not obviously about the perpetuation of an
individual's genes, and in fact contributes to the opposite, death or celibacy (Dawkins
2006, 164). Dawkins claims that by assessing the question of Darwinian benefit we can
confidently reject the superficial parallel between behaviours like anting and religion
(Dawkins 2006, 164). He cites philosopher Daniel Dennett's example of the common
cold to support his assertion. Although the common cold is as ubiquitous as religion
among people, there is no question that the cold has no Darwinian "benefit" to
49 "Anting" is a behavior observed in birds. Birds will either pick up ants with their beak and rub them
over their feathers, or lie over an anthill. Although there is much speculation about the function of this
behaviour (anting might act as way ofreducing feather parasites such as mites or in controlling fungi or
bacteria through the discharge of formic acid from the ants onto the feathers, that it makes the ants edible
by removing the formic acid or that it might be related to feather molting) there has been no convincing
support for any of these theories.
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humankind (Dawkins 2006, 165). While a Darwinian normally defines "benefit" as some
enhancement to the survival of the individual's genes, there are there are three possible
alternative targets of benefit - the group, another individual, the adaptation itself- which
might explain not only the persistence of religion but might provide some insight into its
evolutionary origins. The possibility of seeing the group as a potential target for
Darwinian benefit arises from the theory of group selection,50 which Dawkins defines as
the "controversial" idea that Darwinian selection chooses among species or other groups
of individuals (Dawkins 2006, 170). However, Dawkins rejects this line of explanation,
asserting that there are formidable objections to the concept of group selection, and
arguing that some biologists betray a confusion between true group selection and what
should more properly be called kin selection or reciprocal altruism. Although Dawkins
admits that, in principle, group selection could happen, he rejects the idea that it amounts
to a significant force in evolution and that lower-level selection is always likely to be a
stronger explanation (Dawkins 2006, 1 70). The second possibility is that the observed
individual may be working under the manipulative influence of genes in another
individual such as a parasite. This is a theory that Dawkins advocated in The Extended
Phenotype. In this book he argues that "an animal's behavior tends to maximize the
survival of the genes 'for' that behavior, whether or not those genes happen to be in the
body of the particular animal performing it" (Dawkins 2006, 165). Extrapolating from
50 Group selection describes natural selection operating between groups of organisms, rather than between
individuals. This would produce adaptations that benefit the group, rather than the individual.
5 'Kin selection is an evolutionary theory that proposes that people are more likely to help those who are
blood relatives because it will increase the odds of gene transmission to future generations. The theory
suggests that altruism towards close relatives occurs in order to ensure the continuation of shared genes.
Reciprocal altruism is an evolutionary theory suggesting that altruism (defined as an act of helping
someone else although potentially incurring some cost for this act) could be explained from an evolutionary
perspective by suggesting that it might be beneficial to incur this cost if there is a chance of reciprocity (the
person I helped might behave altruistically towards me in the future).
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the premise of The Extended Phenotype brings us to the third possible target for
Darwinian benefit. Dawkins states that the fact that religion is ubiquitous means that it
has worked out to the benefit of something. Essentially, Dawkins is proposing that, to the
extent that they behave as replicators,52 religious ideas act in their own benefit (Dawkins
2006, 165).
Dawkins identifies himself as one of an increasing number of biologists who see
religion as a by-product of something else (Dawkins 2006, 172). He proposes that those
who speculate about persistence and Darwinian benefit need to reframe the question
because it is possible that the adaptation in question does not have a direct survival value
of its own, but is a by-product of something else that does (Dawkins 2006, 172). He cites
the '"self-immolation behavior" of moths as an example of what he means. ^ Moths fly
into open flames, not as a distinct behavior but, Dawkins speculates, as a by-product of
their celestial navigational systems (Dawkins 2006, 173). Dawkins postulates that, like
the self-immolating moths, religious behavior could be a misfiring - an unfortunate by-
product of an underlying psychological propensity that was or may still be useful
52 In the context of evolution, a replicator is an entity (such as a gene, a virus, or a même) which can get
itself copied, including any changes (mutations) it may have undergone. We will go into the notion that
ideas can behave as replicators a little later in this section.
53 Although it is not my intention in this thesis to refute Dawkins' particular arguments, it is worth very
quickly calling into question the fundamental presupposition underlying his assertion that religion should
be called a misfiring. Dawkins assumes that he can draw unjustified conclusions about human behavior
based on animal, or in this case, insect behavior. Biologist Richard Lewontin calls the confusion between
qualities of animals and qualities of human society the problem of homology and analogy. By homologous
traits, biologists mean those properties of an organism that are shared by different species because they
have a common biological origin and some common biological genetic ancestry, and they derive from
common features of anatomy and development. Even though they look very different and are used for very
different puiposes, the bones of a human arm and of a bat's wing are homologous because they are
anatomically derived from the same structures and influenced by the same genes. On the other hand, a
bat's wing and an insects' wing are only analogous, that is they look superficially alike and they seem to
serve the same function, but they have no origin in common at the genetic or morphological level
(Lewontin, 95). It is very easy to confuse analogy for homology, however, just because two things seem
similar does not mean that they are biologically similar. As Lewontin cautions, analogy is in the eye of the
observer (Lewontin, 95).
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(Dawkins 2006, 174). 54 According to this view, religion is not itself the product of
natural selection, rather, some other tendency, with some other benefit was naturally
selected in our ancestors and only incidentally manifests itself as religious behavior
(Dawkins 2006, 1 74). Thus, the Darwinian question (as defined by Dawkins) becomes,
what is that 'other tendency'? What is religion a by-product of?
The specific hypothesis that Dawkins proposes revolves around the gullibility of
children, although he is clear to stress that it is only an example of the kind of explanation
he means, and that he is much more "wedded to the general principle that the question
should be properly put" than he is to any specific answer (Dawkins 2006, 174). To
explain his hypothesis, he argues that we survive based on the accumulated experience of
previous generations and that experience needs to be passed on to children for their
protection and well-being. Therefore, natural selection builds child brains with a
tendency to believe whatever their parents and tribal elders tell them (Dawkins 2006,
1 76). The crux of Dawkins' argument is that although such trusting obedience is
valuable for survival, its inevitable by-product is vulnerability to infection by mind
viruses as the 'truster' has no way of distinguishing good advice from bad (true things,
like crocodiles will kill you, from false things, such as the existence of a deity) (Dawkins
2006, 176).55
In order to reinforce his broader claim that religion should be considered a
misfiring of some useful tendency, Dawkins moves away from the specific postulate that
54 Dawkins supports this perspective with reference to the work of ethologist Robert Hinde (Wliy God
Persists) and anthropologists, Pascal Boyer (Religion Explained) and Scott Atran (In Gods We Trust) who
have independently promoted the general idea of religion as a by-product of normal psychological
dispositions (Dawkins, 177). Although Dawkins doesn't specify what he means by useful, given the context,
I think it's safe to assume that 'useful' relates to Darwinian benefit and evolutionary survival value.
55 Dawkins repeatedly suggests that religion can and should be thought of as functioning like a virus. We
will elaborate in this idea a little later in this section.
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religion is a by-product of childhood gullibility and provides some alternate possibilities,
providing explanations based in evolutionary psychology, child psychology and
philosophy. According to Dawkins, evolutionary psychologists suggest that the brain is a
collection of organs (or 'modules') for dealing with a set of specialist data-processing
needs, and religions can be seen as a by-product of the misfiring of several of these
modules, such as the module for forming theories of other minds, for forming coalitions,
and for discriminating in favour of in-group members and against strangers (Dawkins
2006, 179). He suggests that any of these could serve as the human equivalent of the
moth's navigational system and is vulnerable to misfiring in the same kind of way as
childhood gullibility (Dawkins 2006, 179). He cites the work of psychologists Paul
Bloom and Deborah Keleman who argue that the human mind, especially as children, has
a natural propensity towards dualism and teleology (inherent tendency to assign purpose
to everything) which predispose us, given the right conditions, to religion (Dawkins
2006, 180-181). 56 Dawkins speculates that the Darwinian advantage of innate dualism
and teleology might come about in an increased capacity for predicting the behaviour
entities in our world, which is important for our survival (Dawkins 2006, 1 80).
He defends this hypothesis with reference to philosopher Daniel Dennett's three-
way classification of the 'stances'- physical, design and intentional - that we adopt in
trying to understand and predict the behavior of entities such as animals, machines or
each other. 57 Specifically, Dawkins supports this hypothesis with a discussion of
56 According to Dawkins, our innate dualism prepares us to believe in a 'soul' or in the existence of a deity
that is separate from and independent of matter. Childish teleology sets up for religion by imputing the
perceived purpose to God (Dawkins 2006, 181).
57 The core idea is that, when explaining and predicting the behavior of an entity, it can be viewed at
varying levels of abstraction. In principle, the more concrete the level, the more accurate the predictions are
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Dennett's 'intentional stance.' According to Dawkins, we are biologically programmed to
impute intentions to entities whose behavior matters to us (Dawkins 2006, 183). An
entity is assumed to be not merely designed for a purpose, but to be, or contain an agent
with intentions that guide its actions. Dawkins asserts that it seems entirely plausible to
him that the intentional stance has survival value as a brain mechanism that speeds up
decision-making in dangerous circumstances and in crucial social situations (Dawkins
2006, 182). He goes on to suggest that both the 'intentional stance' and the 'design
stance,' (considering the function of an entity, in order to understand how it works) are
useful brain mechanisms, important for speeding up the second-guessing of entities
critical for survival, such as predators or potential mates (Dawkins 2006, 1 82). But, like
other brain mechanisms, they can misfire and we end up imputing intentions to entities
without agency or design to entities that have not been designed (Dawkins 2006, 1 84).
The last explanation he offers presents religion as a by-product of psychological
predispositions that are constructively irrational. >9 He finds Dennett's proposal that the
irrationality of religion is a by-product of our irrational, in-built tendency to fall in love -
which presumably has genetic advantages - "especially intriguing" (Dawkins 2006, 184).
likely to be. Physical stance, the first level of abstraction, is concerned with the laws ofphysics and
chemistry. When we predict where a ball is going to land based on its current trajectory, we are taking the
physical stance. Design stance is the second level of abstraction and is commonly used in biology and
engineering. It is concerned with purpose, function and design. When we predict that a bird will fly when
it flaps its wings, on the basis that wings are made for flying, we are taking the design stance. The
Intentional stance operates at the greatest level of abstraction and is concerned with things such as belief,
thinking and intent. When we predict that the bird will fly away because it knows the cat is coming, we are
taking the intentional stance.
58 He cites Paul Bloom, quoting experimental evidence that children are especially likely to adopt the
intentional stance (Dawkins, 1 83).
39 Although he doesn't define what he means by irrational, given the context, it seems to refer to something
illogical, where Dawkins understanding of what logical is strongly informed by what he calls Darwinian
logic, or what appears to be logical in light of evolution. For example, according to Dawkins, falling in
love with one and only one person is irrational because we accept that there is lots of love to be shared
among other relations, and this behaviour does not necessarily confer genetic advantage (Dawkins, 186).
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He asserts that falling in love is an extremely potent force in the brain and it is not
surprising that some mind viruses have evolved to exploit it (Dawkins 2006, 186). He
concludes that it is easy to see 'falling in love' as a special case of Lewis Wolpert's
'irrational persistence' - his claim in Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast that in some
circumstances, it is better to persist in an irrational belief than to vacillate even if new
evidence favours a change. He supplements 'love theory' with a discussion of the
evolutionary benefits of self-deception based on the work of Robert Trivers in Social
Evolution and anthropologist Lionel Tiger in Optimism: The Biology ofHope. According
to this perspective, people have a biological predisposition towards self-deception which
is, like love, a form of 'constructive irrationality' (Dawkins 2006, 187). Dawkins asserts
that the relevance of these claims to a Darwinian understanding of religion needs no
"spelling out" (Dawkins 2006, 188). However, for the sake of clarity, I think that it is
safe to assume that Dawkins is implying that this biological predisposition for self-
deception can account for the persistence of religious beliefs that are unsupported by
empirical evidence.
Dawkins also applies this concept of misfiring to uncovering the evolutionary
roots of human morality, maintaining that the motives underlying human morality, the
urge to kindness, to altruism, to generosity, to empathy, and to pity are all misfirings,
Darwinian mistakes "blessed and precious mistakes" resulting from four basic "selfish"
altruistic drives (Dawkins 2006, 221). According to Dawkins, there are a number of
60 Dawkins is using selfish here as he defined it in the context of "the selfish gene" which he describes as
follows," the whole idea of the selfish gene is that the unit of natural selection is not the selfish organism,
nor the selfish group, or selfish species or selfish ecosystem, but the gene. It is the gene that in the form of
information either survives for many generations or does not" (Dawkins 2006, 215).
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fairly common circumstances in which genes ensure their own selfish survival by
influencing organisms to behave altruistically. He identifies four altruistic drives which
he claims can account for human morality and yet which ultimately function in the
service of our selfish genes. The first two altruistic drives form the primary structure of
altruism and can be observed in a variety of species. In the first case, kin altruism, a gene
that programs individual organisms to favour their genetic kin is statistically likely to
benefit copies of itself. The second case, reciprocal altruism, works because of
asymmetries in needs and in capacities to meet them (Dawkins 2006, 216). The
secondary structures of altruism are especially prevalent in human society - although
examples can be observed in other species. In the third case, altruistic behavior is
motivated by the importance of having a good reputation, which Dawkins argues is
especially important in human society with language and gossip. The last altruistic drive
may be related to social hierarchy. Dawkins argues that altruistic giving may be an
advertisement of dominance or superiority (Dawkins 2006, 2 1 8). Dawkins cautions that
it is important not to mis-state the reach of natural selection. 61 Natural selection favours
rules of thumb which work in practice to promote the genes that built them (Dawkins
2006, 220). These rules of thumb do occasionally misfire - for example, parental drive
misfires to produce the human urge to. adopt a child. Contrary to his discussion of
religion, Dawkins is careful to specify in this context that misfiring or by-product carries
no suggestion of the pejorative (Dawkins 2006, 221).
61 Dawkins claims that selection does not favour the evolution of a cognitive awareness of what is good for
your genes, asserting that, that awareness had to wait for the twentieth century to reach a cognitive level,
and even now, full understanding is confined to a minority of scientific specialists (Dawkins 2006, 220).
Not surprisingly, Dawkins is one of the very few qualified to interpret for the rest of us.
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Dawkins asserts that while conventional Darwinian selection of genes might have
favoured psychological predispositions that produce religion as a by-product, it is
unlikely to have shaped the specific details. Dawkins offers his même theory as
explanation, applying natural selection, and genetic drift to understand the evolution and
spread of religious ideas (Dawkins 2006, 201), (Dawkins 2006, 189). Dawkins returns to
his "gullible child" theory for the sake of illustration, asserting that it is representative of
'by-product' theories in general (Dawkins 2006, 188). This theory states that the child
brain is, for good (i.e. Darwinian) reasons, vulnerable to infection by mental 'viruses'
Dawkins claims that religion is one of these mental 'viruses'. Dawkins claims that it
doesn't matter "what particular style of 'nonsense' infects the child brain, once infected,
the child will grow up and infect the next generation with the same nonsense, whatever it
happens to be" (Dawkins 2006, 188). Dawkins cites the work of nineteenth century
anthropologist James Frazer who identifies certain general principles that are widespread
across "the diversity of irrational human beliefs," which suggests to Dawkins that the
nonsense that infects vulnerable brains is not entirely random, arbitrary nonsense and that
once entrenched in a culture, they persist, evolve and diverge in a manner reminiscent of
biological evolution (Dawkins 2006, 188). He proposes that in order to apply some form
of selection theory to those details, we must look at the cultural equivalents of genes -
'mêmes' which can be broadly defined as unit of cultural transmission (Dawkins 2006,
189).
Dawkins reminds us that in its most general form, natural selection must choose
between alternative replicators. A replicator is a piece of coded information that makes
76
exact copies of itself, along with occasional inexact copies or mutations. He asserts that
those varieties of replicator that happen to be good at getting copied become more
numerous at the expense of alternative replicators that are bad at getting copied, calling
this natural selection at its most rudimentary (Dawkins 2006, 191). Although he does
provide the following caveat, "I am not saying that mêmes necessarily are close
analogues of genes, only that the more like genes they are, the better will même theory
work; and the purpose of this section is to ask whether même theory might work in the
special case of religion" his follow up discussion demonstrates the he has effectively
concluded that it does (Dawkins 2006, 196).
A Critical Examination of Sociobiology
The presentation of the evolutionary roots of morality and religion in The God
Delusion serves a number of purposes. At its most basic, it allows Dawkins to promote
the universal application of the scientific method to fully investigate and explain all
phenomena. Furthermore, providing a biological origin allows Dawkins to effectively
disprove - if not the existence of God, then at least revelation. By revealing the
Darwinian roots of our sense of right and wrong, Dawkins is able to refute the assertion
62 Richard Lewontin is very critical of speaking as though genes, and presumably other replicators, are self-
replicating. He argues that, "It is usually said that genes make proteins and that genes are self-replicating.
But genes make nothing. A protein is made by a complex system of chemical production involving other
proteins, using the particular sequence of nucleotides in a gene to determine the exact formula for the
protein being manufactured. Sometimes the gene is said to be the "blueprint" for a protein or the source of
"information" for determining a protein. As such, it is seen as more important than the mere manufacturing
machinery. Yet proteins cannot be manufactured without both the gene and the rest of the machinery.
Neither is more important. Isolating the gene as the "master molecule" is another unconscious ideological
commitment, one that places brains above brawn, mental word as superior to mere physical work,
information as higher than action. Nor are genes self-replicating. They cannot make themselves anymore
than they can make a protein. Genes are made by a complex machinery of proteins that uses the genes as
models for more genes. When we refer to genes as self-replicating, we endow them with a mysterious,
autonomous power that seems to place them above the more ordinary materials of the body. Yet if
anything in the world can be said to be self-replicating, it is not the gene, but the entire organism as a
complex system" (Lewontin, 48).
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that religion is necessary for people to be good (Dawkins 2006, 214). And yet, while he
presents his ideas with the authority of science, Dawkins' work on human behavior in
The God Delusion is mostly speculative. While his logic might be superficially
persuasive, it is based in un-testable conjecture and the line between clear-sighted,
scientifically informed speculation and Dawkins' own personal and political agenda is
rarely clear. This is one of the fundamental problems of sociobiology, according to
Richard Lewontin.
Sociobiology is a synthesis of scientific disciplines which attempts to explain
social behavior by considering the Darwinian advantages of specific behaviors. It is often
considered a branch of biology and sociology, but also draws from ethology,
anthropology, evolution, zoology, archaeology, population genetics, and other
disciplines. Within the study of human societies, sociobiology is closely related to the
fields of human behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology. Richard Lewontin is
one of a number of evolutionary scientists who is highly critical of sociobiology for,
among other things, its claims to describe a fundamental, universal human nature that,
because it is coded in our genes, is both necessary and inevitable. According to
Lewontin, sociobiological theories ofhuman nature are constructed in three stages
(Lewontin, 89). The first stage is comprised of a description of what human nature is
really like, based in the attempt to build a fairly complete description of those features
that appear to be common to all human beings, in all societies, in all places, in all times.
The second stage involves claiming that those apparently universal characteristics
identified in the first stage are, in fact, coded in our genes - thus, there is a genetic basis
for religiosity, for morality, indeed, for any characteristics that appear to be built into the
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human psyche and human social organization. The third stage involves asserting that
natural selection, through differential survival and reproduction, has inevitably led to the
particular gene characteristics of individual human beings, characteristics that are
responsible for the form of society. Given that sociobiological theory has evolutionary
theory as its foundation, it goes one step further than the purely descriptive biological
theory of human nature articulated in the first two stages in order to explain and in some
sense justify why we come to have these particular genes (Lewontin, 89).
Lewontin argues that the claims in the third stage serve to legitimize the status
quo because it goes beyond mere description to claim that the human nature it describes
is inevitable, given that it is the product of the universal law of the struggle for existence
and the survival of the fittest (Lewontin, 90). 63 The critique that follows should be
familiar by now - although sociobiologists claim to be describing scientifically revealed
truths, they are at best offering their particular interpretations based on scientifically
informed speculation, and at worst presenting an uncritical, unexamined description of
their worldview with all its attendant prejudice and bias as though it was scientific fact.
Lewontin categorically rejects the narrow, ahistorical claims of sociobiology, arguing that
sociobiologists construct their description of what is universal in all human beings by
drawing upon their own society and, to some extent, telling their own life stories. Having
looked inward at themselves and outward at modern capitalist society for a description of
human nature, they then extend it slightly further by looking into the anthropological
record in order to assure us that those very same elements that they find in twentieth-
63 Although it is not essential to our current discussion, Lewontin provides a very interesting discussion of
the interrelationship between the production of scientific knowledge and the justification and perpetuation
of existing social structures in BioIog\: as Ideology.
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century North America and Britain are also in one form or another, displayed by the
others (Lewontin, 90). Further calling into question the foundational assumption of
sociobiology - that the heritability of 'universal' traits provides evidence for a genetic
basis of human social behavior - Lewontin argues that there is there is absolutely no
evidence that these traits are inherited (Lewontin, 96).
Lewontin goes on to critique the assumption held by sociobiologists that we are
essentially the instruments of our genes, the temporary vehicles through which they either
succeed or fail to spread through the world (Lewontin, 1 3). He rejects that, as Dawkins
put it, we are "lumbering robots" whose genes "created us body and mind" (Dawkins
1999, 13). Dawkins extends this view to all replicators (as he defines them) speaking as
though religion is a powerful force acting on otherwise innocent victims (as we will see
in chapter three). Lewontin asserts that this assumption - that we are totally at the mercy
of genetic forces present within us from birth - is part of a deep ideological commitment
that goes under the name of reductionism. 64 As we have seen reductionism prescribes a
way of studying the world, which is to cut it up into individual bits that cause it and to
study the properties of these isolated bits presuming that this will adequately describe the
whole.
The Limits of Reductionism
Although reductionism clearly works for some scientific explanations, Lewontin
maintains that it is not a universally applicable method for the study of all nature. The
reductive approach is not just a way of simplifying the conceptual sciences. Formal
reductions do not just present themselves, they are informed by an individuals'
64 Recall our discussion reductionism from the first chapter.
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worldview. Thus, they are not value free but are always parts of some larger enterprise.
Furthermore, Lewontin asserts that not all of nature can be broken up into independent
parts to be studied in isolation, and it is pure ideology to suppose that it can (Lewontin,
15). He states that reductionism, the ideology behind much of modern science, including
modern biology, makes the atom or individual the causal source of all the properties of
larger collections (Lewontin, 1 3). We have seen that Dawkins takes this approach with
respect to evolutionary theory and it strongly influences the way he constructs his
explanation of religion and morality. Given his focus on the gene and the individual as
the locus of natural selection, Dawkins summarily dismisses even the possibility of
considering greater social context when thinking about religion. Mary Midgley is also
highly critical of the suggestion that reductionism is the only truly scientific - one that
should take precedence over all other methods. She specifically targets Dawkins'
reduction of culture into the standard unit of the même (Midgley 2004, 56). Midgley
argues that the trouble with this approach is that thought and culture do not have a
granular structure and therefore cannot have distinct units for the same reason that ocean
currents do not have one - namely because they are not objects, but patterns (Midgley
2004, 57). Midgley asserts that what she finds most worrisome is the hasty use of certain
patterns that have been found useful in biology to explain human affairs where they have
only a somewhat artificial application, at the expense of the directly relevant study of
human motives (Midgley 2004, 87). She asserts the need to stop thinking about 'science'
as if it was a single monolithic entity, treating it as an expanding empire, destined to one
day take over the whole intellectual world and unite all knowledge into a, a unified,
rational Theory of Everything balanced securely on a single foundation (Midgley 2004,
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22-23). This is clearly in direct contrast with the Enlightenment version of science that
Dawkins espouses. With its dual claims to infallibility and the formal unity of the whole
of thought, Midgley asserts that the Enlightenment idea of science was imperialistic from
the outset (Midgley 2004, 24). She writes that certain reductive ways of thinking that
proved to be immensely successful in the early development of the physical sciences
have been idealized, stereotyped and treated as the only possible forms of rational
thought across the whole range of our knowledge (Midgley 2004, 1 3). She goes on to
qualify that the trouble is not in the methods themselves, as they are admirable in their
own sphere. The problem lies in the impulse to universalize them, exemplified by "the
naïve academic imperialism that insists on exporting them to all other topics" (Midgley
2004, 13).
The Problem of Scientific Imperialism
Tina Beattie writes that scientists like Dawkins believe that they are the
custodians and interpreters of the one and only truth. She goes on to assert that beliefs
like this always mask imperializing tendencies which risk colonizing and negating
different ways of interpreting the world (Beattie, 10). The problem with this perspective
is that such singular and exclusive concepts of truth stifle plurality and difference. Too
often, conviction in exclusive access to truth and knowledge justifies the silencing and
ultimately the destruction of those who offer different versions of truth or reality. Beattie
suggests that in its war on religion, scientific rationalism is simply the latest in the West's
long history of imperial domination by which it seeks to defeat every form of difference,
including religious difference. The vast majority of the world's religious believers belong
among non-Western cultures, and they include many millions of women whose views are
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seldom represented by their scholarly elites. This means that we need to cultivate a much
greater awareness of both the limits and oppressive effects of a debate dominated by the
opinions of a small clique of white English speaking men staging a mock battle about
rationality and God (Beattie, 10). Midgley additionally argues for the recognition that
there are many independent forms and sources of knowledge rather than the reductive
conviction that one fundamental form underlies all knowledge and is capable of
answering everything (Midgley 2004, 27). Contrary to the view of imperializing science,
our knowledge is a network involving all kinds of lateral links, a system in which the
most varied kinds of connection may be relevant for helping us meet various kinds of
questions (Midgley 2004, 25). Conceptual monoculture cannot work because in almost
all our thought, we are dealing with subject matters that we need to consider a
multiplicity of aspects (Midgley 2004, 47).
In The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins perpetuates the view that science consists
of simple, objective truths, and that biologists can and will know everything worth
knowing about human existence. The powerful public image of science that he presents
includes two distinct meanings. He praises science for being value-free, objective,
unbiased, and neutral, defining it as a pure source of facts. He also presents it as perhaps
the only legitimate source ofvalues. The first way of defining science is as a pure
articulation of objective facts about the world as it really is - a warehouse of data about
things such as natural laws, measurements, chemical composition etc. The second is
dependent on a particular worldview or paradigm; it is what Mary Midgley refers to as
the "huge, ever-changing imaginative structure of ideas by which scientists contrive to
connect, understand and interpret these facts" (Midgley 2004, 3). Dawkins doesn't
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differentiate between these two meanings in The God Delusion, perhaps because he is
oblivious to the way he conflates these two distinct concepts. His failure to make this
distinction is at the heart of my critique of his representation of science. The general
concepts, metaphors and images that make up the second definition of structure cannot
possibly be objective and antiseptic in the same way as the 'facts of science'. As we
discussed in the first chapter, we have no way of talking about, let alone understanding
evidence without an interpretive matrix, without the mediation of our particular
worldviews. Because the 'facts of science' must be filtered through our interpretive
frameworks, no one person can speak for science, or can claim that science is the
unfettered voice of nature.
Elsdon-Baker warns us that confusion about what we can and cannot claim to
know in the realm of science can have huge implications for society and it has contributed
to a lack of trust in scientists. When scientists like Dawkins make claims that go beyond
what we can really know through scientific research - for example that God's existence
or non-existence is a scientific fact about the universe, discoverable in principle if not in
practice - it can contribute to public confusion and distrust about what science can and
cannot say. As we have seen, Dawkins' version of science does not necessarily fit with
some of the models we have at our disposal to describe how we know things in science,
and may indeed go beyond what some scientists see as being within the bounds of
science (Elsdon-Baker, 1 83)
Chapter 3: Limited Definitions - Dawkins' representation of God, Religion,
Agnosticism and Atheism
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This chapter will investigate the ways in which Dawkins' worldview informs his
discussion of religion and will attempt to show that his use of the general term 'religion'
is misleading and ill-informed. Although he presents his arguments as though they carry
the authority of 'science,' most of his work in The God Delusion is either philosophical
wrangling, speculation or simply personal opinion. Specifically we will demonstrate that
his definition of religion and God are informed by his ideological commitments rather
than any strong engagement with scholarship and that his nineteenth century perspective
colours his understanding and treatment of religion. We will cast serious critical light on
his claim that religion is and has been evil and that atheism is blameless.
It is clear that The God Delusion is not intended to be a balanced investigation of
religion, or an unbiased application of Darwinian evolution to propose an explanation for
the material origins of religion. It was written to demonstrate that belief in God's
existence is a delusion - and a dangerous delusion at that. Dawkins is writing to justify a
pre-existing set of conclusions, conclusions that are strongly informed by his worldview
presuppositions. As such, he presents his arguments within a framework of meanings
that prefigure his conclusions. In order to support his conclusions, his definitions are
partial, or so narrowly circumscribed as to be effectively meaningless. We have already
seen an example of this with his treatment of fundamentalism. This manipulation of
meaning is not insignificant and is not limited to superficial digression but occurs at the
very core of his argument, specifically in the way he defines God and religion.
Dawkins first concern in The God Delusion is to clarify and explain the difference
between what he calls "Einsteinian religion" and supernatural religion. Dawkins
provides the following quote, in which Einstein describes what he means when he
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describes himself as religious, "(t)o sense that behind anything that can be experienced
there is a something that our mind cannot grasp and whose beauty and sublimity reaches
us only indirectly and as a feeble reflection, this is religiousness, In this sense I am
religious" (Dawkins 2006, 19). Dawkins asserts that although he prefers not to call
himself religious because it is destructively misleading because for the vast majority of
people "religion" implies "supernatural," he considers himself religious in the same sense
as Einstein describes - although Dawkins stipulates that "cannot grasp" does not have to
mean "forever ungraspable" because to his understanding, 'science' can and will lay bare
all mystery and fully explain all of existence (Dawkins 2006, 19). According to
Dawkins, although physicists, including Einstein have used the word 'God' when talking
about the universe, they have meant it poetically or metaphorically. He rejects this usage,
insisting that the word God should be used in the way people have generally understood
it, to denote a supernatural creator that is appropriate for us to worship (Dawkins 2006,
1 3). Dawkins submits that the view of these physicists should be more properly called
pantheism, which is really just 'sexed up atheism,' especially when compared to the
supernatural perspectives of theism and deism. 65 According to Dawkins, "Pantheists
don't believe in a supernatural God at all, but use the word God as a non-supernatural
65According to Dawkins, "theists believes in a supernatural intelligence who, in addition to his main work
of creating the universe in the first place, is still around to oversee and influence the subsequent fate of
his initial creation. In many theistic belief systems, the deity is intimately involved in human affairs. He
answers prayers; forgives or punishes sins; intervenes in the world by performing miracles; frets about
good and bad deeds, and knows when we do them (or even think about doing them)" (Dawkins 2006, 18).
Compare with the Oxford English Dictionary's definition: Theism - Generally used to mean belief in a deity
or in deities, it also means belief in one God as creator and supreme ruler of the universe, without denial
of revelation. Dawkins defines desists as those who "believe in a supernatural intelligence, but one
whose activities were confined to setting up the laws that govern the universe in the first place. The deist
God never intervenes thereafter and certainly has no specific interest in human affairs" (Dawkins 2006,
18). Compare with the Oxford English Dictionary's definition: Deism - belief in the existence of a
Supreme Being as the source of finite existence, with rejection of revelation and the supernatural
doctrines.
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synonym for Nature, or for the Universe, or for the lawfulness that governs its workings"
(Dawkins 2006, 18).
This definition of pantheism is partial; I suspect that this is not only because it
allows him to draw the conclusion that he intends, but is also a product of his limited
conception of God (more on this later in the chapter). Although some scientists may use
this term to refer to their understanding of the scientific laws governing the universe, this
is not how it is universally defined. According to the Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy,
pantheism can by understood as an alternative to, and denial of, theism and atheism.
Pantheism refers to the concept of an entirely immanent God. Pantheists deny the idea
that God is completely transcendent, "totally other" than the world or ontologically
distinct from it. Contrary to theists, pantheists usually deny the existence of a personal
God, rejecting the existence of a "minded" Being possessing the characteristic properties
of a "person," such as having intentional states, and the associated capacities like the
ability to make decisions. Although Pantheism rejects the idea of God having a
personality, it does not reject the concept of divinity, understanding God to mean
something like an all-inclusive divine Unity. Pantheists hold the belief that every
existing entity (humans, animals, etc.) together, is a part of God - that the entire universe
is divine. Pantheism was a common attitude in the early societies of Egypt, India, and
Greece as well as many indigenous religious/spiritual traditions. The term derives from
the Greek pan meaning all and theos meaning deity. This understanding of divinity and
its relation to the world are not simply "metaphoric or poetic synonyms for the laws of
the universe" (Dawkins 2006, 1 8). Therefore, while divinity is understood to be
immanent in the material world, it is not reducible to the natural laws of the universe.
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Many, if not most pantheists believe in an order of existence beyond the scientifically
explainable universe, which could be called a supernatural dimension. Pantheism, as a
general category, is not, as Dawkins asserts, "sexed-up atheism" (Dawkins 2006, 18).
This is not to call into question his assertion that some physicists use 'God'
metaphorically or poetically, rather this is the first indication that Dawkins is using
definitions to suit his purpose and the first suggestion that Dawkins might suffer from a
fundamental failure of the imagination when it comes to thinking about God.
The article on Pantheism in the Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy suggests that
one of the primary reasons for equating pantheism with atheism is the assumption that
belief in any kind of "God" must be belief in a personal God. This is the assumption that
Dawkins makes explicitly in The God Delusion. As we have seen, Dawkins provides the
most explicit definition of what he means by God in the context of the God Hypothesis,
asserting that God is a personal, superhuman, supernatural intelligence, possessing
unpleasantly human qualities, who deliberately designed and created the universe and
everything in it (Dawkins 2006, 3 land 38). Although he provides this narrowly
circumscribed definition of God, he goes on to assert although Yahweh, the God of the
Old Testament, is the supernatural god most familiar to his readers "the God Hypothesis
should not stand or fall with its most unlovely instantiation, Yahweh, nor with his
insipidly opposite Christian face, 'Gentle Jesus meek and mild'" (Dawkins 2006, 20 and
31). He continues: "For brevity I shall refer to all deities, whether poly- or monotheistic,
as simply 'God'" (Dawkins 2006, 35). Dawkins asserts that his goal is not to attack any
particular version of God or gods but rather to attack "God, all gods, anything and
everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented"
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(Dawkins 2006, 36). It is not entirely clear whether he believes that the narrow
definition of God he provides really does stand for all the possible iterations of God or
whether he is over extrapolating from his specific understanding of what God means in
order to broaden his rejection of religion.
Dawkins writes that although he "is aware that critics of religion can be attacked
for failing to credit the fertile diversity of traditions and world-views that have been
called religious," given that his purpose is "to decry supernaturalism in all its forms, the
most effective way to proceed will be to concentrate on the form most likely to be
familiar to my readers - the form that impinges most threateningly on all our societies"
(Dawkins 2006, 36). He explains: "For most of my purposes, all three Abrahamic
religions can be treated as indistinguishable. Unless otherwise stated, I shall have
Christianity mostly in mind, but only because it is the version with which I happen to be
most familiar. For my purposes the differences matter less than the similarities"
(Dawkins 2006, 37). As we will discuss in greater detail later in the chapter, to suggest
that religion can be universally defined and condemned by extrapolating from specific
denominations of particular traditions is not only to deliberately and uncritically reduce a
huge diversity of human thought and experience to conform to Dawkins' pre-existing
definitions and biases, but presents a distorted view of a complex and varied human
phenomenon.
As we have seen, Dawkins argues that religion is a by-product or misfiring of
some other predisposition that was naturally selected in our ancestors, and that the
specific content of religion can be accounted for with his theory ofmental 'viruses' or a
'mêmes.' However, although Dawkins attempts to uncover the biological origins of
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religion, he only provides a speculative account of the biological predisposition for belief.
Dawkins demands proof of God's existence because according to his perspective, only
that which can be proved is worthy of belief. However, as Tina Beattie reminds us, the
word 'God' has almost never been used to denote a 'thing' whose existence can be
proved. She goes on to remind us that people are not irrational or deluded when they say
that they believe in things like love, beauty, compassion, or hope whose 'existence' we
cannot prove (Beattie, 13). His cursory attempt to refute the traditional arguments for
God's existence presents religion as a series of creedal propositions. However, as John
Gray asserts, religions do not consist of propositions struggling to become theories. The
incomprehensibility of the divine is at the heart of Eastern Christianity, while in
Orthodox Judaism practice tends to have priority over doctrine. Buddhism has always
recognized that in spiritual matters truth is ineffable, as do Sufi traditions in Islam.
Hinduism has never defined itself by anything as simplistic as a creed. It is only some
western Christian traditions, under the influence of Greek philosophy, which have tried to
turn religion into an explanatory theory (Gray 2008). Dawkins has an essentially
cognitive definition of religion which suggests that a discussion of religion is
indistinguishable from a discussion of the existence of God. In The New Atheists: The
Twilight ofReason and the War on Religion, Tina Beattie argues that Dawkins'
conflation of belief in god with religion is problematic because many people who believe
in God are not religious, and those who manifest the most intense religiosity may have
little faith in God (Beattie, 50). Contrary to Dawkins' claim that all religion must be
abolished in order to eradicate the breeding grounds for uncritical faith, Beattie suggests
that religion can survive just as readily without belief in God as belief in God can survive
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without religion (Beattie, 50). She goes on to assert that the relationship between belief
in God, religious affiliation and religious observance is complex (Beattie, 50).
Beattie cautions that the word religion cannot be defined with any precision. We
have seen that our contemporary understanding of religion originated in the nineteenth
century as a category that refers to those aspects of human behavior and belief that are
not accounted for in a scientific worldview. The nineteenth century confidence that
human experience could be ordered and categorised according to a set of scientifically
revealed universal laws meant forcing a wide range of cultural phenomena into the
narrow category of religion (Beattie, 46). The nineteenth-century invention of religion as
an independent category meant the grouping together of a diversity of cultural practices
vaguely associated with religious beliefs (Beattie, 46). Thus, 'religion' loosely refers to
an inclusive and yet difficult to define landscape of culture, theology and philosophy, art,
history, politics, myth and devotion (Beattie, 11). It refers to that particular genre of
enacted stories which are, for the most part, informed by a sense of transcendence and
which seek meaning beyond the material facts of our biological existence (Beattie, 1 1).
The fact that 'religion' has been used to cover such a broad range ofpractices and ideas
means that every scholarly attempt to come up with a workable definition has failed.
This is either because it is so broad that it encompasses everything from football to
Marxism, or because it is so narrow that it excludes belief systems such as Buddhism and
Confucianism which do not necessarily appeal to a divine origin or source of revelation
(Beattie, 46). Scholars of religion, such as Tina Beattie, argue that although the complex
of ideas and behaviour labeled 'religion' is not readily susceptible to scientific scrutiny,
rationalisation and proof, this does not necessarily render it false or unreal (Beattie, 11).
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It may simply mean that that the tools and methods of reductive science are not able to
provide a sufficient account of these phenomena. This has been the position of a number
of scientists who argue that 'science' should be agnostic about many religious claims,
such as the existence of God.
Dawkins accuses agnostic scientists of being disingenuous, and castigates them
for their claims of agnosticism, comparing them to Neville Chamberlain. His rejection of
agnosticism is necessary to support his assertion that the probability of god's existence is
so slight that any rational person has no excuse in taking a 'noncommittal' position.
However, like his definition of pantheism, his definition of agnosticism is also partial.
Dawkins asserts that his boyhood preacher was partly right to condemn agnostics as
"namby-pamby, mushy pap, weak-tea, weedy, pallid fence-sitters" (Dawkins 2006, 46).
Contrary to his boyhood preacher, Dawkins argues that agnosticism is not an inherently
flawed position as it is the only reasonable position in cases where we lack evidence one
way or the other. A certain kind of agnosticism is an appropriate stance on many
scientific questions - Carl Sagan, for instance, was proud to be agnostic when asked
whether there was life elsewhere in the universe (Dawkins 2006, 46). In order to answer
the question of whether agnosticism is an appropriate stance to take with respect to the
question of God, Dawkins distinguishes between two kinds of agnosticism: Temporary
Agnosticism in Practice (TAP), and Permanent Agnosticism in Principle (PAP).
"Temporary Agnosticism in Practice is the kind of legitimate fence-sitting where there
really is a definite answer, one way or the other, but we so far lack the evidence to reach
it (or don't understand the evidence, or haven't had time to read the evidence, etc.)." TAP
would be a reasonable stance towards the cause of the Permian extinction, the greatest
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mass extinction in fossil history. "There is a truth out there and one day we hope to know
it, though for the moment we don't" (Dawkins 2006, 47). "Permanent Agnosticism in
Principle is a deeply inescapable kind of fence-sitting. The PAP style of agnosticism is
appropriate for questions that can never be answered, no matter how much evidence we
gather, because the very idea of evidence is not applicable. The question exists on a
different plane, or in a different dimension, beyond the zones where evidence can reach.
An example might be that philosophical chestnut, the question whether you see red as I
do" (Dawkins 2006, 47). According to Dawkins, God's existence belongs in the TAP
category, and, as we have seen, when the issue of probability is factored in, the
appropriate response is a kind of qualified atheism because, according to Dawkins,
atheists don't have faith, and reason alone could not propel one to total conviction that
anything definitely doesn't exist (Dawkins 2006, 50). He contrasts this view with
agnosticism, treating the term 'agnostic' as though it meant simply and exclusively
doubtful or noncommittal. Dawkins presents the position of the completely impartial
agnostic as one that holds that "God's existence and non-existence are exactly
equiprobable" (Dawkins 2006, 50). However, this interpretation applies more to the
colloquial use of the term and fails to engage with the legitimate epistemological claims
inherent in agnosticism, claims that seriously undermine Dawkins' position on the
omnicompetence of science.
The term 'agnostic' was originally coined by English biologist, Thomas Henry
Huxley from the Greek agnôstos, meaning ignorant, and gnosis, meaning knowledge.
Known as "Darwin's Bulldog" for his tenacious and uncompromising defense of
Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection, Huxley is said to have coined the
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term in 1860 at the founding party of the Metaphysical Society in London in order to
describe a methodology for approaching metaphysical questions. Dawkins quotes
Huxley's explanation of agnosticism. He states that, "(a)gnosticism, in fact, is not a
creed but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single
principle ...Positively the principle may be expressed: In matters of the intellect, do not
pretend that conclusions are certain that are not demonstrated or demonstrable" (Dawkins
2006, 49). Dawkins rejects this position, asserting that what matters is not whether God
is disprovable, but whether his existence is probable (Dawkins 2006, 55). He argues that
Huxley was so focused on the absolute impossibility of proving or disproving God that he
seems to have been ignoring the shades ofprobability. As we have seen, Dawkins'
intention in this section of The God Delusion is to demonstrate that God's existence is so
improbable that the only reasonable, scientific position is defacto atheism (Dawkins
2006, 50).
Evolutionary scientist, Stephen J. Gould explicitly refutes this position, arguing
that given its empirical basis science must be agnostic about the existence of God. He
asserts that "(w)e neither affirm nor deny it (God's possible superintendence of nature);
we simply can't comment on it as scientists" (qtd in Dawkins 2006, 55). Dawkins
strenuously rejects.the idea that the question of God's existence is beyond the scope of
the scientific method, calling it a "remarkably widespread fallacy" that "embodies the
poverty of agnosticism," because it implies that science cannot even make probability
judgments on the question of existence (Dawkins 2006, 58). Dawkins fails to see the
greater issue at the heart of agnosticism. By treating agnosticism as though it was the
centre point on a spectrum between complete faith in God's existence and complete faith
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in his non-existence, Dawkins seems to believe that not only does agnosticism represent a
position with respect to God's existence, but that this position is based on the belief that
existence and non-existence are equally probable. As stated by Huxley, and quoted by
Dawkins, agnosticism is not a creed but a methodology. It is not a position on God's
existence, but a different way of thinking about the question itself. In its original usage,
agnosticism was a form of skepticism applied to metaphysics and theology based on the
position that that which cannot be grasped by experiment is inaccessible to the human
mind and to perception. Thus, agnostics are not those who have simply not formed a
judgment on the existence of God, but are those who have concluded that, human reason,
or - in the case of later thinkers like Gould - the scientific method, is incapable of making
such a judgment at all. Dawkins seems to be confused by Gould's position, asserting that
"Gould, by the way, was not an impartial agnostic but strongly inclined towards defacto
atheism," and asking, "on what basis did he make that judgment, if there is nothing to be
said about whether God exists?" (Dawkins 2006, 58). Gould's statement was about the
limits of what science can say about the existence of God, whereas atheism, defacto or
otherwise is a question of personal conviction, contrary to Dawkins' contention that
atheists do not have faith (Dawkins 2006, 51). Implying that god doesn't exist surpasses
the limits of methodological naturalism_(exclusively natural explanations) and ends up
making a metaphysical claim; he is really doing negative theology in The God Delusion.
Dawkins relies on the work in Julian Baggini's Atheism: A Very Short
Introduction to formulate his definition of atheism, asserting that "what most atheists
believe is that there is only one kind of stuff in the universe and it is physical, out of this
stuff comes minds, beauty, emotions, moral values - in short the full gamut of the
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phenomena that gives richness to human life" (Dawkins 2006, 13). He goes on to
elaborate, specifying that "human thoughts and emotions emerge from exceedingly
complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain. An atheist in the sense of
philosophical naturalist66 is somebody who believes there is nothing beyond the natural
physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking beyond the observable
universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles - except in the sense of natural
phenomena that we don't yet understand. If there is something that appears to lie beyond
the natural world as it is now imperfectly understood, we hope eventually to understand it
and embrace it within the natural" (Dawkins 2006, 14).
Dawkins' definition of atheism equates it with scientific rationalism and relies on
a specific understanding of what is natural and what is supernatural. Beattie cautions us
to keep in mind that the categories ofnatural and supernatural are culturally defined.
When we talk about nature, we are using language to describe the world around us with
all its species, life forms and landscapes; and nature is a concept whose meaning changes
with different perceptions and ways of looking at the world across different cultures and
throughout history (Beattie, 51). The way we define 'supernatural' is based on our
definition of 'natural' as it refers to phenomena or experiences which do not seem to fit
within our particular expectations of what nature is or should be. This means that
'supernatural' is also a concept which has different meanings (Beattie, 51). Beattie also
suggests that for many people who are less determinedly materialistic than Dawkins,
there may exists a middle state, an indeterminate region which is neither strictly natural
66 Dawkins specifies that for many ofus, naturalist simply means a student of the natural world, whereas
for philosophers, naturalist is used "in a very different sense, as the opposite of supeniaturalist" (Dawkins
2006, 13). Recall the discussion of naturalism in the first chapter.
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not strictly supernatural. Many people experience a range of emotions, memories, and
associations which endow 'natural' objects with symbolic significance that transcend
their natural, biological functions and communicate something in the realm ofbeauty,
hope and love, making them in some sense 'supernatural' (Beattie, 51).
Dawkins asserts that faith is maladaptive because it is based on inner conviction
rather than empirical evidence. Contrary to Dawkins' claims, atheism is not the absence
of faith, and it is not science. Atheism includes beliefs and metaphysical presuppositions.
As we have seen, scientific understanding is socially constructed. One might go so far as
to suggest, as Beattie does, that it is a delusion to think that science offers an objective,
value-free position from which to evaluate all claims of truth and meaning (Beattie, 12).
Dawkins' atheism is thoroughly embedded in his broader worldview, one full of
convictions and metaphysical presuppositions, most notably his Utopian understanding of
history, progress and human perfectibility. We all have metaphysical assumptions about
the world, we all have beliefs that we cannot prove using the scientific method, we all
have faith that is not founded on empirical evidence -faith in love, for example. Our
moral attitudes are informed by our sense of what is right, of what is just, of how people
ought to behave and what the world ought to be like. These beliefs are almost always
informed by metaphysical presuppositions and there is nothing inherently wrong with
that. There is nothing disreputable about having ideals; what is problematic is when we
assume that our ideals are universal, when we assume that they are a reflection of the
Truth, when we try to force others to see the world as we do.
The Christian roots of Dawkins' Perspective
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Dawkins' worldview is strongly informed by Christianity. Tina Beattie asserts
that Britain and America are Christian nations with a strongly Protestant tradition, and as
such, anyone brought up in such an environment is likely to be shaped by that tradition
unless he or she has had a specifically different religious upbringing (Beattie, 43). Many
of the concepts that Dawkins deploys, including the idea of religion itself, have been
shaped by monotheism. His atheism involves a rejection of religion which he has defined
based on his understanding of fundamentalist forms of Christianity, and to a lesser extent,
Islam. As such it is both defined by and dependent on Christianity. Tina Beattie argues
that Dawkins' conception of religion, like that of most nineteenth century thinkers,
follows the Protestant model which placing a strong emphasis on individual faith,
scripture, and morality, and is primarily concerned with questions of evidence and
rationality(Beattie, 42), (Beattie, 5). Like those Victorian thinkers, Dawkins is ill
equipped to understand the religious ideas and practices of non-Western cultures (Beattie,
42). Many religions have little to do with the kind of solitary one-to-one relationship
with the divine that this model takes for granted. Contrary to Dawkins' interpretation of
religion, informed by his understanding of evolution and the Protestant model and
concerned only with the individual, most religions are primarily collective expressions of
social narratives and traditions, and are not necessarily associated with the kind of
individualistic beliefs he presupposes (Beattie, 42). Beattie suggests that the cultural
assumptions about religion, such as those informing Dawkins, still mask considerable
prejudice and ignorance with regard to non-Christian religions as can be seen in his
treatment of his treatment of Buddhism and Hinduism in The God Delusion. Furthermore,
Gray articulates the ways in which Dawkins' conception ofhistory, of progress, of what
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would constitute "a better world" and how that is to be achieved are conditioned by the
West's religious inheritance. Gray argues that Utopian ideologies like Dawkins' are
informed by concepts that entered Western thought with Christianity and have shaped it
ever since (Gray 2007). Our history has been so thoroughly shaped by Judeo-Christian
tradition that we cannot conceive of society without it. AU judgments, including ethical
ones, begin somewhere and those of Westerners, most often begin in Judaism and
Christianity (Gray 2008). Gray asserts that intellectual honesty demands that he at least
acknowledge that his moral vision derives, to a considerable extent, from the tradition
that he despises (Gray 2008).
Given Dawkins' assertion that religion is the source of much of the world's evil,
and his insistence that religious extremism is one of the greatest dangers we face today, it
is remarkable that he spends so little time or effort trying to understand it. If we are
going to have any hope of understanding religion and the role it plays in peoples' lives,
we need to pay attention to the many different ways that religious and cultural narratives
act to impart meaning. Beattie argues that the attempt to use 'religion' in a generic,
universalizing sense eradicates the real differences, resulting in a distorted understanding
of the diversity of human cultures with respect to their historical and geographical
contexts as well as their social, political, and domestic dimensions (Beattie, 48). She
suggests that in order understand anything about religion, we have to go beyond the idea
of 'religion' and include the diverse cultures, identities, and histories which make up
different traditions (Beattie, 47). In The God Delusion, Dawkins claims to be perplexed
by Astronomer Royal and President of the Royal Society, Martin Rees who describes
himself as an 'unbelieving' Anglican... out of loyalty to the tribe' (Dawkins 2006, 335).
And yet, as Beattie reminds us, religion has always been as much about tribal loyalty as it
has been about belief in God (Beattie, 50) - something that Dawkins might account for if
not for his refusal to deal with any scholarship on religion. His work in The God
Delusion suffers from a serious lack of insight which would invite a more nuanced
approach to the role played by religion in different contexts. However, Dawkins is
writing with the foregone conclusion that religion is bad, and that the best thing would be
to eliminate it all together. He spends the last section of The God Delusion attempting to
demonstrate that religion is a harmful, destructive force in the world.
Pernicious Delusion versus Enlightened Reason
The last section of The God Delusion is devoted to demonstrating that God is
pernicious delusion. In attempting to demonstrate that religion is dangerous, Dawkins
points out the dark, dysfunctional, or destructive actions of people 'possessed' by
religion. He argues his case by contrasting the evil done under the influence of religion
with the benign or even positive influence of atheism, presenting the more extreme cases
and then positioning himself and his perspective as the very representative of reason and
liberal values in comparison. Demonstrating both his lack of interest in the complexities
of social context and his reductionist fixation on a single, biological cause, Dawkins
asserts that he is "inclined to suspect that there are very few atheists in prison," going on
to state that he is "not necessarily claiming that atheism increases morality, although
humanism- the ethical system that often goes with it probably does" (Dawkins 2006,
229).
It is Dawkins' contention that while it is clear that religion systematically
influences people to do bad things, there is not the smallest bit of evidence atheism does
(Dawkins 2006, 273). He asserts that while individual atheists, like Hitler or Stalin, may
do evil things, they don't do evil in the name of atheism (Dawkins 2006, 278). By
contrast, he maintains not only that religious wars are truly fought in the name of religion
but that they have been horribly frequent. He states that he cannot think of any war that
has been fought in the name of atheism, asking, "why would anyone go to war for the
sake of an absence ofbelief (Dawkins 2006, 276). He claims that terrorists and
Christians who murder abortion doctors are motivated by their perception of
righteousness, doing what their religion tells them to do. He asserts that they are "not
psychotic, they are religious idealists who by their own lights are rational. They perceive
their acts to be good...because they have been brought up, from the cradle to have total
and unquestioning faith" (Dawkins 2006, 303). He rejects the claim that religious faith
might not be unique in inspiring extremism, arguing that "religious faith is an especially
potent silencer of rational calculation which usually seems to trump all others." He
suspects that this is mostly because of the easy and beguiling promise that death is not an
end, and partly because it discourages questioning by its very nature (Dawkins 2006,
303). He asserts that only religious faith is a strong enough force to motivate such utter
madness in otherwise sane and decent people (Dawkins 2006, 303).
67 He complains Hitler's atheism is an assiduously cultivated legend which is intended, at least in part, to
discredit atheism. Although he has already argued that "the interesting question is not whether evil (or
good) individual human beings were religious or were atheists - what matters is not whether Hitler and
Stalin were atheists but whether atheism systematically influenced people to do bad things" (Dawkins
2006, 272-273), he attempts to argue that the real problem was probably German Christianity. He points to
the long Christian history ofhating Jews as 'Christ Killers' before attempting to demonstrate that Hitler,
himself, had at least some religious feeling (Dawkins 2006, 273). He then goes on to argue that Hitler
didn't carry out his atrocities single-handedly, that his orders were carried out by soldiers and officers, most
of whom, he asserts, were surely Christian before suggesting that that, if his actions didn't actually flow
from his personal religious feelings, it is possible that Hitler used religion to cynically manipulate the
Germans (Dawkins 2006, 276) concluding that, "in any case, the evils of Hitler's regime can hardly be held
up as flowing from atheism" (Dawkins 2006, 273)
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As we saw in chapter two, according to Dawkins, people are in some sense at the
mercy of replicators. This understanding is what informs his assertion that not only is
religion is a strong force for evil that acts on "otherwise sane and decent people." He
provides the example of evangelical Christian and geologist Kurt Wise, who when faced
with a conflict between the teachings of his religion and his science, chose his religion.
Dawkins explains this decision by asserting that Wise's mind was mind fatally subverted
and weakened by a fundamentalist religious upbringing calling the imperative of
religious faith a form of mental torture (Dawkins 2006, 284), (Dawkins 2006, 286). He
goes on to state that he is hostile to religion because of what it did to Kurt Wise,
cautioning that "if it did that to a Harvard educated geologist, just think what it can do to
others less gifted and less well armed" (Dawkins 2006, 286). He also discusses the
example of Paul Hill, a fundamentalist Christian who murdered abortion doctors,
maintaining that he does not consider Hill to be a psychopath, just dangerously religious.
Dawkins asserts that what was wrong with Hill was his religious faith, suggesting that if
not for this faith, he never would have acted as he did (Dawkins 2006, 297). These
examples are an illustration of how Dawkins understands religion; he denies Wise, and
any other religious person, any agency in how they negotiate their worldviews, in how
they contend with paradoxical or conflicting explanations or moral dilemmas. According
to Dawkins, religion is an overwhelmingly powerful force that compels otherwise
intelligent and good people to behave badly. Following the methodology of
sociobiologists discussed in the second chapter, Dawkins states that there is a universal
moral Zeitgeist, going on to argue that that there are some people whose religious faith
takes them right outside of what he calls the " enlightened consensus" ofthat moral
Zeitgeist. Dawkins suggests that these people represent the dark side of religious
absolutism, and they are often called extremists (Dawkins 2006, 303). And yet Dawkins
is not merely denouncing extremism, he is denouncing all religion, stating that "the take
home message is that we should blame religion itself, not religious, 'extremism' - as
though that were some terrible perversion of real, decent religion" (Dawkins 2006, 305).
Dawkins insists that as long as we accept the principle that religious faith must be
respected simply because it is religious faith, it is hard to withhold respect from the faith
of Osama bin Laden and suicide bombers, although he does not justify this assertion. He
suggests that this is one of the reasons that he does everything in his power to warn
people against faith itself, not just so-called 'extremist' faith, asserting that the teachings
of 'moderate' religion, while not extremist in themselves, are an open invitation to
extremism because even mild and moderate religion helps to provide the climate of faith
(Dawkins 2006, 306), (Dawkins 2006, 303). Dawkins protests that faith means that you
don't have to make the case for what you believe, that if somebody announced that
something is part of their 'faith,' "the rest of society, whether of the same faith, or
another, or none, is obliged by ingrained custom, to respect it without question, respect it
until the day it manifests itself in a horrible massacre like the destruction of the WTC"
(Dawkins 2006, 306). Dawkins claims that suicide bombers do what they do because of
their faith and they were taught that that faith not necessarily by extremist fanatics but by
gentle mainstream religious instructors (Dawkins 2006, 306). He suggests that
Christianity and Islam teach children that "unquestioned faith is a virtue" and in so doing
68 The idea the suicide bomber act exclusively based on their religious beliefs has been strongly refuted in a
number of sources. Indeed, suicide bombing had its origins with the atheist, socialist Sri Lankan Tigers.
We will look at Hedges discussion of the motivation for suicide bombers later in the chapter.
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non-fundamentalist, 'sensible,' religion is making the world safe for fundamentalism
(Dawkins 2006, 297). 69 More generally, Dawkins would like to argue that what is really
pernicious is the practice of teaching children that faith itself is a virtue because faith can
be fatally dangerous, and to deliberately implant it into the vulnerable mind of an
innocent child is a grievous wrong (Dawkins 2006, 308). He goes so far as to suggest
that the teachings of the Catholic Church amount to mental abuse that might ultimately be
more damaging to children than any of the sexual abuse that has plagued the Church
(Dawkins 2006, 312). 70 Dawkins maintains that faith is an evil precisely because it
requires no justification and brooks no argument. He asserts, with no support or
justification, that teaching children that unquestioned faith is a virtue primes them to
grow up into potentially lethal weapons for future jihads or crusades and that if children
were taught to question and think through their beliefs - instead of being taught the
superior virtue of faith without question - it is a reasonable assertion that there would be
no suicide bombers (Dawkins 2006, 307-308).
Dawkins champions atheism for its roots in empirical evidence over faith based
on inner conviction. And yet, as we have seen, atheism and science do have some faith
claims, make some metaphysical propositions and, as a human enterprise, science is as
liable .to be used for inhumane purposes as any other human institution. As Beattie
writes, both science and religion are umbrella terms for a range of human ideas and
practices. Neither of them can be judged in the abstract, for they are only as good or as
bad as the people who practice them. They both include individuals who commit
69 Not only does he treat these two very diverse traditions as though they unitary monolithic objects, but he
in no way supports this assertion.
70 He makes this assertion by comparing a friends' explanation of her childhood terror of hell with his
experience of molestation as a child.
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themselves wholeheartedly to working for the good of humanity and they both include
individuals who are driven by personal ambition, greed and lust for power (Beattie, 69).
Although he provides some violent and destructive examples of religion, as well as a
litany of statistics revealing that red states with many conservative Christians suffer
higher rates of crime, including murder, burglary, and theft, Dawkins does not
successfully establish that all religious faith produces destructive behavior (Dawkins
2006, 229). His argument here is based on a logical fallacy that is commonly refuted in
the sciences - the assumption that correlation proves causation, that two events that occur
together have a cause-and-effect relationship. This is yet another example of how
Dawkins' argument in The God Delusion fails to live up to the standards of scientific
inquiry he values so highly.
In his review of The God Delusion, Orr identifies the assertion that religion is a
pernicious force in the world as Dawkins' key empirical claim, and asks the very
important question: compared to what? Although his work in The God Delusion is
anecdotally convincing that religion can be bad, Orr points out that he fails to examine
the question in a systematic way, comparing religion as it is practiced in the world, with
all its compromise, corruption, and incompetence with atheism as theory (Orr para. 4).
Comparing both as practiced, with an unflinching eye, would not support his conviction
that atheism "comes out on the side of angels." Given his Utopian perspective, Dawkins
has a hard time acknowledging that the twentieth century has been a time of spectacular
and widespread violence, much of it resulting from attempts to create societies without
religion by men like Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot, examples that run contrary to Dawkins'
assertion that there is no evidence that atheism has systematically influenced people do
evil.71 In his review in The Guardian, Gray asserts that it is unlikely that Mao, who
launched his assault on the people and culture of Tibet with the slogan "religion is
poison," would have agreed that his atheist world-view had no bearing on his policies
(Gray 2008). Gray is also highly critical of the way Dawkins dismisses any suggestion
that the crimes of the Nazis could be linked with atheism, calling it simple minded
reasoning (Gray 2008). Gray writes that not only was Hitler a tremendous booster of
science, but that he was very impressed by vulgarised Darwinism (Gray 2008). He
goes on to assert that although Hitler might have used Christian anti-Semitic demonology
in his persecution of the Jews, and that the churches collaborated with him to a horrifying
degree, it was ultimately the Nazi belief in race as a scientific category that laid the
foundation for one of the most atrocious crimes against humanity (Gray 2008). Gray
maintains that there can be no reasonable doubt that Hitler's worldview was a type of
atheism (a hotchpotch of counterfeit science and animus towards religion) or that it
helped make Nazi crime possible (Gray 2008). Dawkins' inability to see this, his
insistence that Nazism and Communism are anomalies, divorced from the central
tradition of the modern West reflects his Utopian ideological commitment. Contrary to
his view that "absolutism nearly always results from strong religious faith, and it
constitutes a major reason for suggesting that religion can be a force for evil in the
world," absolutism is by no mean a religious monopoly (Dawkins 2006, 286).
71 Although this is the term that Dawkins uses, it is a very loaded term with many layers of meaning, many
of them subjective. For that reason, I will deliberately avoid using this term unless I am citing its use by
someone else.
72 Social Darwinism refers to the roundly rejected application of the theory of natural selection to human
society. It suggests that the strongest or fittest should survive and flourish in society, while the weak and
unfit should be allowed to die this theory is used to justify eugenics programs aimed at weeding
"undesirable" genes from the population, often, as in Nazi Germany, accompanied by sterilization laws
directed against "unfit" individuals.
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Extremism is extremism whatever its specific content. The problem is in totalitarianism
that seeks to control and limit the ways that people think and feel. If we are to
understand religion, we must explore the way in which ideas and beliefs function in
society and in relation to one another. We have to understand not only their social and
historical environments, but the role of particular beliefs in terms of their cultural, ethical
and political influence. As we saw in our discussion of worldviews, religion is one of a
number of factors influencing our interpretation of the world, as such it is almost
meaningless to isolate it as the singular motivating influence, especially with respect to
extremism and fundamentalism
Christopher Hedges, an American journalist in Middle East politics, offers a far
more nuanced discussion of the subtle and complex historical and social factors
influencing the current rise of Islamic fundamentalism that includes a consideration of
Western colonialism and a recognition of the West's contemporary complicity in Middle
Eastern instability (Hedges, 132). 73 He identifies a sense of collective rage and
humiliation as a driving force, much stronger than religious belief (Hedges, 137). He
discusses a study on suicide bombers by Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic
ofSuicide Terrorism, which identifies the collective sense of national and religious
humiliation as the strongest motivators for bombers who see themselves as avenging real
and perceived injustices (Hedges, 137). He argues that in their approach to religion
generally and Islam in particular, the New Atheists might actually be fuelling this
collective humiliation and rage (Hedges, 138). He reminds his reader that terrorists arise
in all cultures, all nations and all ideologies and suggests that those who externalise and
73 1 do not mean to suggest that this is the only, or even the best way of thinking about fundamentalism.
This discussion of Hedges work is intended to act as an example of an alternative to Dawkins' approach.
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seek to eradicate evil risk losing touch with their humanity and the humanity of others
(Hedges, 145 and 154).
Religion as Sciences' "Other"
As discussed in the second chapter, Tina Beattie asserts that the emergence of
religion as a modern term of reference and an object of study must be understood in terms
of its inherent definition as science's 'other' (Beattie, 39). Broadly speaking, the term
'other' refers, or attempts to refer, to that which is 'other' than the concept being
considered. The term often means a person other than oneself. As Beattie explains,
feminist and critical theorists have argued that the concept of the 'modern man of reason'
resulted in the construction of an 'other' that was the locus of all those forces and entities
which opposed and threatened the identity of the masculine T (Beattie, 40). This
resulted in the internalization of a number of binary oppositions which were then treated
as fundamental and natural such as: male v. female; civilization v. nature; reason v.
superstition; rational v. emotional; light v. dark; good v. evil. According to Beattie,
feminist and critical theorists have understood the 'other' as the repressed and silenced
opposite of the dominant subject, so that the relationship between the two is not one of
genuine difference but of positive and negative significance (Beattie, 40). The language
of difference masks a hierarchy of relationships between the identity of the subject and
the non-identity of its 'other' (Beattie, 40). That is to say that the relationship privileges
one of the terms, treating it as superior to the other. The term 'deconstruction' associated
with postmodern thinkers like Derrida seeks to destabilise the certainty of Western ethics
and knowledge by calling into question the relationship between these oppositional
pairings in order to show how their hierarchical meaning sustain social and sexual
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inequalities (Beattie, 41). The representation of religion by Dawkins is a clear case of
'othering' as he groups together vast undifferentiated masses of humanity under the label
'religion' in a way which eliminates difference and diversity and presents it as the
opposite of science. The other is constructed as a dark irrational power - threat to the
project of scientific rationalism and its values and beliefs - which has to be mastered in
the interests of science, reason and progress (Beattie, 41). However, as much as Dawkins
might protest, religion is not wholly other than science. They depend on each other for
their very definitions, and as we saw in the first chapter, presuming that these are two
autonomous categories locked in conflict is to ignore their much more nuanced history of
mutual information and interaction.
Dawkins' intention is clearly not to study religion in the interest of understanding,
but rather is an attempt to bring scientific objectivity to bear on a condition that 'afflicts'
a majority of people on earth - to bring religion under the authority and scrutiny of the
scientific method. However, only those who are free from its grips are sufficiently
rational and objective to be capable of analysing it. 74 This perspective means that those
who are religious are not treated as complete feeling thinking human beings but as
objects of study by a highly unsympathetic Western elite bent on eliminating and
destroying those beliefs, thereby releasing them from their 'delusions.' The work on
religion in The God Delusion is dismal when held to the standards of the scientific
74 As we have seen, Dawkins identifies himself as one of a minority of scientific specialists with the
cognitive awareness of what is good for your genes (Dawkins 2006, 220) by this he means that he is one of
a minority of scientific specialists able to speculate on the Darwinian benefit of human behaviours, like
religion.
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method. Dawkins' conclusions have clearly been set and this work is written to justify
them. It is hardly the careful, intellectually rigorous work one would expect from a
scientist, especially one who negatively contrasts these very tendencies in religious
thought with an idealized version of scientific thinking that involves careful attention to
the evidence and an openness to changing one's mind. Dawkins only recognizes his
brand of truth, but most people, in practice, recognize a variety of truths. We would all do
well to heed Tina Beattie's assertion that "we have no hope of understanding our fellow
human beings unless we are willing to embark upon the struggle of trying to understand
those whose views of the world may be very different from our own. Unless we seek
understanding we are condemned to ever greater violence and tyranny arising out of the
clash between dominant and powerful majorities, and alienated and desperate minorities"
(Beattie, 15).
Conclusion
Secular Utopian thinking, like that of Dawkins,' is rooted an Enlightenment faith
in the moral perfectibility of humankind through the power of knowledge (in this case,
narrowly defined as rational, scientific knowledge). Utopian thinkers understand history
as a prolonged, entrenched battle between the forces of good and evil, with human
knowledge advancing and developing cumulatively with the expectation that as the store
of human knowledge grows, so too do improvements in ethics, - that progress in science
will be matched by progress in society. For these thinkers, the defects of any society are
not the product of a fundamentally flawed human nature. Rather, they are the result of
universal repression that can soon be ended. For Dawkins, faith/belief in god/religion is
the source of this universal oppression. Only once humankind has been freed from this
oppressive delusion, and reason has replaced superstition, will the conditions for a truly
moral human existence be possible.
In purporting to evaluate the claims of religion using the methods of science, The
God Delusion is an extension of the Enlightenment project to assert the omnicompetence
of science- that is, the ability of science, and specifically Darwinian evolution to
evaluate all truth claims. The Enlightenment taught that reason and the scientific method
could be applied to all aspects of human life, and that this application would lead to
progress, human enlightenment and a better world. Gray has argued that Utopian ideals -
the perfection of society and of humankind, the notion that we are moving towards
salvation or universal emancipation - have been the most dangerous and destructive
legacies of Christianity and the Enlightenment.
Utopian thinkers have demanded the eradication or silencing of those who do not
see the world as they do. As Hedges describes, "(t)hose who believe in collective moral
progress define this progress by their own narrow, cultural, historical, linguistic and
social experience. They see the "other' as equal only when the other is identical to
themselves. They project their own values on the human race. . .Those who are different
do not need to be investigated, understood or tolerated, for they are intellectually and
morally inferior. Those who are different are imperfect versions of themselves" (Hedges,
22). Dawkins, a Utopian thinker, turns his particular ideas of good into an absolute,
universal standard. In so doing, he constructs a moral hierarchy: those who share their
views are good; those who fail to share these views are evil. Dawkins' project is not to
destroy these negative aspects of religious fundamentalism, but to replace them with his
own versions of the same. He wants to replace one totalizing discourse with another and
it is this aspect of his work that has, rightly, led to the charge of atheist fundamentalism
and which accounts for his construction of a natural conflict between science and
religion.
Epilogue
We have to contend with some very real, very serious problems - from
environmental concerns, to human rights issues - problems whose solutions will require
that people with a wide diversity of ways of seeing the world collaborate. I agree with
Dawkins, there are some very alarming and potentially dangerous conflicts between
people with fundamentally different ways of seeing the world, and fundamentally
different priorities. However, I strongly disagree with and reject his approach. I believe
that it is serving to intensify and exacerbate these tensions. He is perpetuating a Western,
elitist, imperializing attitude to knowledge and truth, that is, not surprisingly being
roundly rejected by those it excludes. I am very concerned that by presenting his
personal views as though they were simply 'science/ he is not only misrepresenting an
important and valuable source of knowledge and understanding, but he is contributing to
a growing distrust and, in some cases, rejection of science. More importantly, however,
he is contributing to the attitude that it is not only acceptable, but necessary and just to
treat other human beings with contempt, derision and scorn, simply because they do not
see the world as we do. Dawkins has become one of the popular and well known voices
of atheism, but he does not speak for all atheists. He does not speak for me. It is possible
to hold a scientific worldview and still accept that there are other, important kinds of
knowledge and truth; it is possible to be an atheist and respect those who do not see the
world as you do. I venture that it is not only possible, but necessary. This does not
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mean that automatic respect is accorded to all religious ideas, as Dawkins suggests, but
that people are not discounted simply because they are religious. If you are concerned
about any of the many issues we currently face, I propose that there is nothing to be
gained and everything to lose in pretending that both the problems and their solutions are
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